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The Project on Government Oversight listed 632 reported acts of government contractor 
misconduct since 2007 that resulted in settlements or fines totaling $41.95 billion in the 
government contracting industry. Government contracting officials changed the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 2009 to reduce acts of misconduct. The purpose of this 
causal-comparative study was to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 significantly 
reduced the rate of reported contractor misconduct and to investigate the impact of the 
change on government contractor ethics business processes. Deterrence theory guided 
this study of how the change to the FAR in 2009 impacted the rate of reported 
government contractor misconduct (dependent variable) and government contractor 
ethics business processes (dependent variable). Data were collected on the top 100 
government contractors over 2 separate 3-year time periods (independent variable), 2006 
through 2008 and 2010 through 2012, before and after the change to the FAR. Data 
extracted from official government databases and government oversight organizations 
included annual contract awards (n = 600), contractor misconduct reports (n = 600), and 
contractor ethics business process records (n = 600). A Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks test 
resulted in 2 findings. First, the rate of reported government contractor misconduct was 
not significantly reduced by the change to the FAR in 2009, z = -0.949, p = .34, r = -.072. 
Second, government contractor ethics business processes were significantly impacted by 
the change to the FAR in 2009, z = -12.263, p < .001, r = -.763. This study may 
contribute to positive social change by informing federal contracting authorities and 
corporate executives that implementing ethics business processes did not reduce 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
The U.S. government and governments throughout the world are concerned with 
reducing expenses (Herbert & Rothwell, 2013). Employing contractors can mitigate that 
concern by creating efficiencies and reducing government expenses (Hansson & 
Holmgren, 2011). Employing contractors reduces cost and increases efficiency by 
reducing government infrastructure and streamlining business processes (Herbert & 
Rothwell, 2013).  
Government contracting began in colonial America but reliance on contracting 
has increased since George Washington’s use in the 1770s (Jenks, 2010). Kean (2011) 
discovered that during World War II, between 1940 and 1944, the U.S. government spent 
$175 billion on government contracts, resulting in a 1500% increase in contractor profits. 
Government contracting dependence increased in the 1980s and 1990s because business 
experts advised cost saving measures to increase efficiencies and adaptable business 
processes (Terman & Yang, 2010). Government contracting companies comprised nine 
of the top 10 U.S. businesses in 2009 (Hayden, Campbell, & Cummins, 2010). The U.S. 
government employs contractors to reduce expenses; however, government contractors 
seek to maximize profits (Cordery, Baskerville, & Porter, 2011). The desire for maximum 
profit leads to contractor misconduct (Olusegun, Ogunbode, Ariyo, & Alibi, 2011). As a 
result, increasing employment of government contractors increases the U.S. 
government’s exposure to contractor misconduct (Roberts, 2010). 
Representatives of the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) determined that 




Corporations that committed the known acts of misconduct paid $41.9 billion in fines and 
settlements (POGO, 2014). The U.S. government’s escalated employment of contractors 
and increased exposure to contractor misconduct has resulted in numerous laws, 
regulations, and government oversight programs designed to deter contractor misconduct 
(Roberts, 2010).  
The lack of oversight and contract clarity caused increased contractor misconduct 
within the private security industry (Gomez del Prado, 2011). Warnock (2012) believed 
political agendas, biased enforcement of contracting rules and regulations, and poor 
oversight compromise the U.S. government’s ability to influence contractor misconduct. 
I selected deterrence theory as the foundational theory for my study. Deterrence 
theory explores the influencing of unethical or illegal activity through the threat of 
imposed penalties or sanctions (Paternoster, 2010). Best (2013) listed prevention, 
detection, and prosecution as the three components of deterrence theory. Dickinson 
(2013) argued that oversight is the most important part of deterrence because it is the 
foundation for accountability and prosecution. Compromising any of the three elements 
will result in an ineffective deterrence program (Best, 2013).  
The U.S. government changed the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 2009 
(FAR, 2008). The change included self-reporting of contractor misconduct, ethics and 
compliance programs, ethics training, and expanded debarment and suspension 
enforcement (FAR, 2008). Government officials designed the change to deter contractor 




Congressional acts and U.S. government contracting official rule changes were 
implemented to reduce instances of misconduct (Dorey et al, 2012). The Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 required that all contractor cost estimates be 
within 80% of actual costs in an effort to reduce fraudulent pricing strategies (Dorey et 
al., 2012). The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) empowered both 
private citizens and the U.S. government in their role of policing contractor behavior 
(Titolo, 2011). FERA was an extension of the Whistleblowers Protection Act of 1989 
designed to protect those reporting misconduct (Titolo, 2011). The Close the Contractor 
Fraud Loophole Act (CCFLA) required federal government contractors begin self-
reporting all instances of misconduct in 2009 (Warnock, 2012). The Federal Awardee 
Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) development began in 2009 as a 
component of The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act of 2009. 
Government officials designed FAPIIS to improve contractor responsibility through 
shared awareness of contractor misconduct between government agencies (Nackman, 
Rathbone, Myers, & Pannier, 2011; Warnock, 2012).  
The U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight 
investigated the federal government contracting industry due to continued contractor 
misconduct (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). Warnock (2012) believed the U.S. 
government’s contractor oversight program was ineffective without prosecuting 
violations. Coleman (2011) believed that self-reporting has not improved corporate 
ethical behavior. The U.S. government’s contractor misconduct deterrence program 




explored the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 2009 on 
reducing contractor misconduct.  
Background of the Problem 
Instances of government contractor misconduct are traceable to 80 of the top 100 
government contractors (POGO, 2014). Fines and settlements for misconduct total $41.9 
billion since 2007 (POGO, 2014). The U.S. Senate’s concern about the seriousness of 
contractor misconduct led the Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight to 
investigate government contracting industry business practices (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 
2010). The U.S. government instituted a change to the FAR in 2009 in an effort to reduce 
misconduct violations (OSBP, 2011; POGO, 2014). Changes included whistleblower 
protections, mandatory corporate ethics programs, and self-reporting of all misconduct 
violations (OSBP, 2011). While reported instances of misconduct violations continue, 
there is no information available to determine if the governmental changes and 
requirements have reduced misconduct violations (OSBP, 2011; POGO, 2014).  
The FAR (2014) lists penalties for contractor misconduct. Penalties for 
misconduct include exclusion from bidding on current and future contracts, fines and 
financial penalties, debarment of the offending contractor or individual, and prosecuting 
individual violators and corporate executives. The punitive actions listed in the FAR are 
designed to deter contractor misconduct (FAR, 2014; Roberts, 2010). Understanding the 
effectiveness of the penalties on those committing acts of misconduct may help to 
identify if the existing penalties reduce the propensity to commit misconduct violations 




Despite the availability of information about the quantity of contractor 
misconduct and governmental actions taken to reduce misconduct, academic information 
on the effect of the U.S. government’s deterrent actions upon unethical behavior within 
the federal government contracting industry is lacking. Statistical information on 
contractor misconduct is available, as well as information on government actions to deter 
misconduct within the federal government contracting industry. Understanding the 
impact of change to the FAR in 2009 upon the contracting industry may lead to future 
changes in government requirements, reporting procedures, and government penalties 
that may lead to reductions in federal government contractor misconduct. 
Problem Statement 
There have been 632 reported misconduct violations resulting in settlements or 
fines totaling $41.9 billion in the federal government contracting industry since 2007 
(POGO, 2014). Researchers found instances of misconduct in 80% of the top 100 
government contractors and 60 of the top 100 with multiple violations (POGO, 2014; 
Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). The U.S. government created policy changes requiring 
federal government contractors to self-report violations and to create business ethics 
awareness and compliance programs (FAR, 2014). Misconduct violations result in the 
U.S. government pursuing fines, terminations of contracts, debarment, suspension, 
imprisonment, or a combination of these penalties in an effort to curtail future violations. 
The general business problem is the rate of misconduct violations within the federal 
government contracting industry. The specific business problem is the lack of 




federal government contractor misconduct and (b) the impact of the change on federal 
government contractor ethics business processes. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-
comparative study was to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 has influenced the 
rate of reported contractor misconduct and to investigate the impact of the change on 
federal government contractor ethics business processes. The independent variable in this 
study was time, which was divided into two parts. Time 1 was a 3-year (2006 through 
2008) time period prior to the change to the FAR in 2009. Time 2 was a 3-year (2010 
through 2012) time period after the change to the FAR in 2009. The two dependent 
variables were the instances of reported contractor misconduct and the government 
contractor ethics business processes. I conducted secondary quantitative research and 
quantitative data collection to gather information.  
Secondary quantitative research included reviewing and analyzing articles, 
studies, and statistical data collected on past contractor misconduct violations. 
Quantitative analysis indicated that the change to the FAR in 2009 did not significantly 
reduce the instances of reported misconduct within the top 100 federal government 
contractors. The top 100 government contractors represented 55% of government 
contract awards for the 450,000 registered with the U.S. government (Federal 
Procurement Data System [FPDS], 2014). The intent was to determine if the change to 
the FAR in 2009 significantly affected the reported rates of reported contractor 




processes. DeCremer, Mayer, and Schminke (2010) believed that reducing instances of 
government contractor misconduct increases ethical conduct throughout the entire 
organization and improves corporate social responsibility. 
Nature of the Study 
I proposed conducting a quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-
comparative design study. Data collection techniques included structured record reviews, 
legal documents and findings, and statistical analysis of historical information retrieved 
from government contract reporting databases. Collection and analysis of historical 
information from government archives was consistent with Kristin and Robbins’s (2010) 
belief that quantitative methodology is the best method for studies comprising historical 
records and archived statistical information research.  
Statistical information and data collection included online U.S. government and 
government oversight organization databases. Quantitative methodology was best suited 
for online statistical research (Barnham, 2012). Data collection efforts for this study 
included information on federal government contractor misconduct instances from 2006 
through 2012. Yu-Jia (2012) believed causal-comparative design was an effective choice 
for researchers seeking to infer causality between a dependent variable and an ex post 
facto independent variable.  
Loidolt (2009) stated that the type of methodology is determined by what the 
researcher is trying to determine. Qualitative methodology was the optimum choice to 
determine decision-making reasons, values, and experiences; however, quantitative 




time (Loidolt, 2009). Examining both the reported government contractor misconduct 
rate and contractor ethics business processes for 3-year periods pre and post the change to 
the FAR in 2009 made quantitative methodology the appropriate choice.  
Research Question 
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-
comparative study was to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 had influenced the 
rate of reported contractor misconduct and to investigate the impact on federal 
government contractor ethics business processes. The goal of the study was to determine 
if a causal relationship existed between an independent variable (time before and after the 
change to the FAR in 2009) and two dependent variables (rate of reported government 
contractor misconduct and government contractor ethics business processes). I examined 
reported contractor misconduct and components of contractor ethics programs for 3 years 
prior to 2009 and for 3 years after 2009. The study of the independent variable consisted 
of official government documents and regulations. The study of the dependent variables 
consisted of government contractor oversight databases. The research questions for this 
study included 
1. Has the change to the FAR in 2009 reduced the rates of reported government 
contractor misconduct?  






H10: There was no statistically significant decline in the rate of reported contractor 
misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009. 
H1a: There was a statistically significant decline in the rate of reported contractor 
misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009. 
H20: There was no statistically significant change in the government contractors 
ethics business processes after the change to the FAR in 2009. 
H2a: There was a statistically significant change in the government contractors ethics 
business processes after the change to the FAR in 2009. 
Theoretical Framework 
My study was based upon deterrence theory. Simply stated, deterrence theory is 
the threat of imposed penalties or sanctions to prevent illegal or unethical acts 
(Paternoster, 2010). A key component of deterrence is the perceived possibility of 
detecting misconduct (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). Dickinson (2013) stated that oversight 
is an important part of deterrence because it is the foundation for accountability and 
prosecution. Paternoster (2010) believed deterrence is the foundation of legal systems. 
Laws are created, penalties and punishments are determined for violating the law, 
violations are discovered, and penalties imposed, all with the hope that the mere threat of 
punishment modifies behavior (Paternoster, 2010).  
Paternoster (2010) stated that the intellectual study of deterrence theory is traced 
to the writings of Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789). According to Paternoster, 




Beccaria’s principles ranged from linking human motivation to wanting pleasure or 
avoiding pain to establishing a scale matching punishments to crimes (Paternoster, 2010). 
Moreover, Beccaria’s nine principles helped inform early understanding of deterrence 
theory (Paternoster, 2010). Bentham’s (1789) work An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation was a coupling of prospective punishments and penalties attached 
to the principles espoused by Beccaria (Paternoster, 2010). Bentham believed that 
punishments must be harsh enough to outweigh the prospective reward of mischievous 
behavior and applied without regarding outside considerations (Paternoster, 2010). 
Paternoster believed that Beccaria and Bentham together formed deterrence theory.  
Deterrence theory is effective if two aspects are present (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010; 
Qing, Zhengchuan, Tamara, & Hong, 2011). First, individuals must believe their 
misconduct is likely to be discovered (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). Secondly, punishment 
must exceed the potential reward for misconduct violations (Qing et al., 2011).  
Ogilvie and Stewart (2010) believed that the likelihood of discovery is the 
greatest deterrent. The U.S. government conducts contract audits and uses contractor self-
reporting to discover misconduct (OSBP, 2011). Self-reporting is the U.S. government’s 
solution for detecting misconduct that otherwise may go undetected (Bhojwani, 2012). 
Qing et al. (2011) stated that the voluntary disclosure of acts of misconduct is contrary to 
normal behavior and is therefore a questionable method for discovering misconduct. Self-
reporting influences the deferment of punishment for voluntarily reporting misconduct 
(Coleman, 2011). Furthermore, Coleman (2011) believed that if the punishment for self-




more likely than self-reporting misconduct. The U.S. government’s emphasis on self-
reporting runs counter to the belief that increasing the probability of detection is the most 
important factor for reducing unethical conduct (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010).  
Ogilvie and Stewart (2010) believed that as penalty severity increased, so does the 
deterrent effect. Furthermore, Qing et al. (2011) found that deterrence is rendered 
ineffective when an individual perceives the benefit of an unethical behavior was greater 
than the probability of punishment. The U.S. government’s implementation of the 
prescribed penalties for misconduct is subjective and may not be effective (FAR, 2014; 
OSBP, 2011).  
Understanding the use and effectiveness of deterrence theory in areas outside of 
the business world is important. Reviewing academic literature in other areas such as 
speed limits (Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011), corporate antitrust actions (Lande & 
Davis, 2011), nuclear deterrence or mutually assured destruction (O’Neil, 2011), and 
information security policies (Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012) showed how deterrence 
theory effectiveness can be determined within the federal government contracting 
industry. Understanding the effectiveness of deterrence in general helped determine if the 
government’s actions to reduce misconduct and the change to the FAR in 2009 are 
deterring misconduct. Qing et al. (2011) believed that the perceived cost and benefit of a 
behavior influences an individual’s behavioral decision. Ogilvie and Stewart (2010) 
found that perceived cost and benefit affected the propensity for unethical behavior. 




considering why the change was or was not effective. My quantitative study indicated the 
effectiveness of the change to the FAR in 2009 in deterring misconduct.  
Definition of Terms 
The following definitions were key terms used within the study. 
Change to the FAR in 2009: In November 2008, members of the FAR Council 
issued a change to the FAR for fiscal year 2009 (FAR, 2008). The change included 
mandatory ethics awareness and compliance programs, mandatory self-reporting of 
contractor misconduct, mandatory written code of business ethics and conduct, 
mandatory ethics awareness and compliance employee training, and potential debarment 
or suspension for noncompliance to the changes (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2008). 
Contracting officer representative (COR): CORs are U.S. government contracting 
officials that have received training in contract administration and are responsible for 
contract administration and contractor oversight (Karstrom, 2013). 
Contracting officer technical representative (COTR): COTRs are U.S. 
government officials responsible for performing contractor oversight on technical 
contracts (Karstrom, 2013). Karstrom (2013) stated that COTRs might not have contract 
administrative training. 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS): Warnock 
(2012) defined CPARS as the U.S. government’s database designed to store the procuring 
contracting officer’s report on contractor performance. 
 Corporate ethics programs: The FAR (2014) defined corporate ethics programs 




corporate compliance to ethical processes and procedures. Exact corporate ethics 
program requirements are listed in FAR part 32.203.1 and included ethical behavior 
standards, procedures, communications plans, training, compliance, internal control 
system, periodic reviews, and reporting procedures (FAR, 2014). 
Debarment: Tillipman (2013) defined debarment as the exclusion of a federal 
contractor from any contract or subcontract award for a period not exceeding 3 years. 
Debarment action applies to an individual, corporate affiliate, entire government 
contracting corporation, or any combination thereof (Tillipman, 2013). 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): The FAR is the primary regulatory 
document governing U.S. government agency contracting and acquisition efforts (FAR, 
2014). 
Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS): 
Willard (2013) stated that FAPIIS is the publically available, U.S. government database 
that stores contractor performance records and reports. The FAPIIS database combines 
information from CPARS and SAM (Willard, 2013). 
Federal government contractor: A federal government contractor is a business 
entity that is registered as an active participant in the Central Contractor Registry (FAR, 
2014). 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS): FPDS is the U.S. government’s 
procurement award repository that provides public access to federal procurement 




Government Accountability Office (GAO): The GAO is the U.S. government 
agency that provides oversight on all federal government spending (Healthcare Financial 
Management Association [HFM], 2011). 
Government penalties: Government penalties are actions the U.S. government 
imposes upon a federal government contractor that committed misconduct. Government 
penalties include exclusion from contract bid, fines and financial penalties, restitution, 
debarment, and prosecution of individual violators and corporate executives (FAR, 
2014). 
Misconduct: Misconduct is an intentional or unintentional violation of FAR part 
52.203-13, the Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct, or other applicable 
contract clauses (FAR, 2014). The FAR (2014) provides a list of misconduct violations 
including fraud, improper pricing, human resource violations, and other legal or ethical 
violations as defined by the FAR and applicable contract clauses.  
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP): Lessack (2013) 
stated that the OFFCP provides oversight on federal government contractor performance 
and contract compliance. 
Project on Government Oversight (POGO): POGO is an independent 
organization that investigates government contractor misconduct and maintains a 
contractor misconduct database on the top 100 government contractors (Warnock, 2012). 
System for Award Management (SAM): SAM is the U.S. government’s centralized 
contractor registry where all federal government contractors must register and maintain 




Top 100 federal government contractors: The top 100 federal government 
contractors are the top 100 federal government contractors listed by contract obligation 
dollars for a given fiscal year (FPDS, 2014). 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
The following assumptions were considered true for this study. I researched 
multiple sources to ensure the accuracy of all archived and statistical data. Government 
statistical information and the legal documentation available were accurate, complete, 
and factual. The archived data, academic sources, and peer-reviewed references were 
accurate, unbiased, and factual. 
Limitations 
The study’s considered limitations included the statistical reliance on the U.S. 
government contracting industry’s self-reporting procedures and the reliance on public 
documentation regarding information on sealed legal settlements and classified contract 
vehicle violations. Quantifying previous research and studies was a potential limitation. 
Replication of information and findings due to similarities in secondary research 
materials, topics, participants, and organizations was an additional limitation. 
The ex post facto nature of causal-comparative design was a limitation (Brewer & 
Kuhn, 2010). Researchers using an ex post facto design cannot control the variables 
because variable manipulation has already occurred (Brewer & Kuhn, 2010). Brewer and 






I collected data from FPDS, SAM, FAPIIS, and POGO. Collecting and comparing 
data from multiple sources reduced the limitation of reliance on government contractor 
self-reporting and publically available documentation. Careful review of secondary data 
when collecting data and compiling statistical information decreased the risk of 
duplicating data collected from similar sources. The delimitation for random sampling is 
purposive sampling (Brewer & Kuhn, 2010). Purposive sampling is the intentional 
selection of a homogeneous subset from a population (Huck, Beavers, & Esquivel, 2010). 
I selected the top 100 federal government contractors from the 450,000 registered and 
active government contractors (FPDS, 2014).  
I conducted focused research and allowed for the concentrated study of statistical 
information associated with the top 100 federal government contractors. I controlled 
personal bias by using proven research tools, trusted materials, and approved methods to 
collect information. I used SPSS to perform data collation and analysis. 
Significance of the Study 
Reduction of Gaps  
Available academic literature indicated that regulations and penalties designed to 
deter unethical or illegal behavior had mixed results. Lande and Davis (2011) found that 
Department of Justice anticartel policies had no effect upon antitrust violations. O’Neil 
(2011) discussed the positive effect of deterrence in the nuclear arms race and Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Government-imposed self-reporting 




pharmaceutical industry (Coleman, 2011). Lande and Davis found that governmental 
deterrent actions led to reductions in unethical or illegal behavior within private industry. 
The OSBP (2011) listed government programs, policies, and procedures for deterring 
misconduct within the federal government contracting industry, yet information is 
unavailable on the effectiveness of these deterrent efforts.  
Findings from the doctoral study provided researchers, academicians, and U.S. 
government leaders information on the effectiveness of deterrent measures and their 
influence on corporate ethical behavior. The findings provided the federal government 
contracting industry with information to aid in reducing or deterring misconduct. The 
findings informed leaders throughout the federal government contracting industry on the 
trends in contractor misconduct and government oversight. 
Implications for Social Change 
This quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-comparative study 
involved understanding the effect of the change to the FAR in 2009 on reported 
government contractor misconduct and on government contractor ethics business 
processes. The U.S. government mandates corporate ethics programs to reduce instances 
of misconduct (FAR, 2014). Reducing instances of misconduct may improve ethical 
behavior and responsibility throughout the organization (DeCremer et al., 2010). Yolles 
and Sawagvudcharee (2010) believed that misconduct stems from placing private gain 
over all other interests within an organization. The corporate ethics program’s purpose is 
to affect all corporate stakeholders positively, which include employees, U.S. government 




Understanding the effectiveness of the change to the FAR in 2009 on reducing 
instances of government contractor misconduct helps the U.S. government determine if 
further action is required. Furthermore, understanding the effect of the change to the FAR 
in 2009 on government contractor ethics business processes helps government contractors 
determine if further change is needed. Instances of misconduct are found throughout an 
organization and not confined to a single area (Cragg, Arnold, & Muchlinski, 2012). 
Reducing instances of government contractor misconduct increases the probability of 
reducing unethical conduct throughout an organization and benefit the corporate 
stakeholders (DeCremer et al., 2010). 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
I conducted a literature review to further understand the history of government 
contracting, government contracting misconduct, and the deterrent steps the U.S. 
government took to reduce contractor misconduct. I searched university provided 
electronic databases. The electronic databases I primarily used were Business Source 
Complete, ABI/INFORM Complete, and Military and Government Collection. The 
keywords used for the search on contractor misconduct included contract violations, 
contractor misconduct, government contractor, ethics violations, and contractor ethics. I 
reviewed 70 articles from 41 journals. Furthermore, I reviewed archived information on 
two trusted government websites.  
Through my review, I found that decreasing the expense of government was a 
global concern (Herbert & Rothwell, 2013). The business of government never declines 




Government contracting fills the cost savings need through reduced government size. The 
U.S. government employs federal government contractors to reduce costs and create 
efficiencies (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). Contracting governmental services cost less 
than paying government employees in those same roles (Kilbride, 2010). Employing 
contractors enables the government to reduce costs and increase efficiencies through 
force reduction and streamlining of business processes (Herbert & Rothwell, 2013). Cost 
savings are a result of contracting services for shorter terms and eliminating the costs of 
missed time and long-term cost of retirement pensions (Parker, 2010). Business 
efficiencies result from federal contractors functioning in a dynamic business 
environment where government organizations function in a bureaucratic environment 
(Herbert & Rothwell, 2013). 
Government Contracting 
Reducing the cost of government services is not a new concept. George 
Washington employed contractors for services and support during the Revolutionary War 
(Jenks, 2010). Jenks (2010) believed the U.S. government began employing contractors 
to meet requirements; however, reasoning shifted to employing contractors for increased 
efficiency and cost effectiveness. Government contracting continued and increased 
throughout U.S. history (Kaen, 2011). Kaen (2011) found that DuPont increased 
corporate profits by 990% during a 3-year period in World War I. The U.S. government 
spent over $175 billion in government contracts from 1940 to 1944 (Kaen, 2011). The top 
100 contractors were awarded the majority contracts with $35 billion awarded to the top 




in increased contractor profits of 1500% from 1939 to 1944. Increased contractor profits 
led Congress to investigate 6,900 federal contractors (Kaen, 2011).  
Government contractor critics suggested that the higher profit margins of 
contractors were due to unethical business practices and not because of lower capital 
investments and lower overhead costs (Wang & San Miguel, 2012). Business experts 
promoted increased contracting during the 1980s and 1990s to improve government 
efficiency and reduce government spending (Terman & Yang, 2010). Jenks (2010) 
believed that increased contracting led to problems measuring efficiency due to the 
government’s inability to determine the number of contractors deployed to support Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Dickinson (2013) found that the contractor to troop ratio in Afghanistan 
and Iraq was approximately 1-to-1. U.S. government officials believed the number of 
contractors exceeded the number of U.S. military members in the Iraqi Theater (Jenks, 
2010).  
Government contracting has continued increasing in the United States (Dickinson, 
2013). Hayden et al. (2010) found that nine of the top 10 U.S. business conglomerates 
were government-contracting organizations. The conglomerates have operated businesses 
throughout the United States and wielded significant political influence down to 
congressional districts (Hayden et al., 2010). Hayden et al. believed the government 
contracting industry’s political influence has increased dramatically in the last 50 years.  
The industry’s influence is seen in the increased contract spending over the past 
15 years to a total of over $560 billion annually (Amey, 2012). Mori and Doni (2010) 




(GDP). Mori and Doni believed that job creation is a byproduct of America’s dependence 
upon government contracting. U.S. government contracting companies provided millions 
of jobs (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). Sonn and Gebreselassie (2010) found that 
government contractor jobs increased by 43% between 2000 and 2006. 
The decline in government provided services caused the U.S. government’s 
increased reliance on contracting (Knott, 2011). Moreover, government provided 
services, such as interrogation and force protection, transitioned to government 
contractors in 2001 (Jenks, 2010). Military contractors performed support roles in 
wartime that allow the military to focus on combat operations (Kilbride, 2010). Karstrom 
(2013) believed that contractors coexist where military presence is required. The U.S. 
government turned to government contractors for other services such as human resources 
(HR), finance and accounting, equipment repair and maintenance, and logistical support 
(Herbert & Rothwell, 2013).  
Howlett and Migone (2013) found government services contracting growth 
beyond normal services to policy-making and organizational management activities. 
Krishnan (2011) stated that the U.S. government has historically employed government 
contractors in intelligence operations. The use of contractors in intelligence expanded 
between the end of the Cold War and the late 1990s to approach 70% of the 2009 
Intelligence budget. Moreover, the U.S. government has spent approximately $50 billion 
annually for contracted services related to intelligence (Krishnan, 2011). 
 The U.S. government’s reliance on contractors has been because of a desire for 




sets, efficiencies, and cost savings (Krishnan, 2012; Parker 2010). This reliance was due 
to a desire to promote economic prosperity (Parker, 2010). However, the result was the 
U.S. government’s reliance on contractors to perform governmental functions and made 
the government susceptible to increased political costs, legal complications, and instances 
of contractor misconduct (Demessie, 2012). 
Demessie (2012) stated that government officials contradict themselves in 
contracting. Government officials created rules and regulations to decrease misconduct, 
yet they created rules and regulations that foster a business atmosphere that increases the 
propensity for misconduct (Demessie, 2012). Congress determined the federal 
government contracting industry practiced widespread fraud in 2007 (Titolo, 2011). 
Maser and Thompson (2011) stated the government contracting process is rife with 
misconduct opportunities. Clarke (2012) found that contractors believed the bidding 
process was corrupt; however, the contractors did not believe that employees within their 
own organization behave unethically.  
Hayden et al. (2010) stated that government contracting continued to increase 
despite widespread fraud, corruption, waste, and nonperformance. Lewis and Bajari 
(2011) determined that highway construction contractors cost the state of California 1.2 
billion annually due to failure to meet contract requirements. The need to deter contractor 
misconduct and maximize the benefit of U.S. government contracting for services led to 




Government Contracting Misconduct  
The growth of U.S. government contract services has increased the opportunities 
for contractor misconduct (Roberts, 2010). The U.S Government uses contracting to 
reduce cost; however, federal contractors operate with the opposite mindset of increasing 
corporate profitability (Cordery et al., 2011). Corporations operate on a for-profit basis 
and make decisions accordingly (Olusegun et al., 2011). Olusegun et al. (2011) believed 
the desire for maximum profit was the leading cause of corporate misconduct. Cordery et 
al. (2011) found that government contractors focused on solutions for government 
problems that maximized their profits and not necessarily on the government’s priorities. 
Kean (2011) produced historical evidence of corporate greed through the 1500% increase 
in profits during WWII. Cordery et al. found that government contracting for healthcare 
services has not delivered on the promise of reduced cost but increased cost by 60%. The 
profitability gap between the government contracting industry and similar 
nongovernment contracting industries increased since 1992 (Wang & San Miguel, 2012).  
Knott (2011) believed contractor misconduct is derived from the U.S. government 
structure. The U.S. functions as a republic and creates opportunities for misconduct 
(Knott, 2011). Wang and San Miguel (2012) found that top government contractors 
exercised political influence and a strong bargaining position to create opportunities for 
their companies. Corporate influence is possible because the U.S. political system allows 
contractors to employ lobbyists to influence the political system (Knott, 2011). Knott 
believed that lobbyists used their influence to increase contractor profitability while 




believed the federal government contracting industry’s ability to shape government 
policy invites misconduct. 
The misconduct environment has included a variety of opportunities (Knott, 
2011). Dorey et al. (2012) found that improper cost estimating in 2009 resulted in a 
doubling of the actual costs for procurements. Kean (2011) determined that contractors 
used creative accounting practices to mask increased corporate profits during World War 
II. Hayden et al. (2010) discovered that government contractors formed alliances to 
reduce competition and increase corporate profits. Rogers (2010) believed the root of the 
problem was that government-contracting companies weigh the costs of compliance 
against the penalties for noncompliance and make the decision that creates the most 
profit.  
The U.S. government has recognized the misconduct atmosphere exists and has 
taken steps to mitigate misconduct (Bhojwani, 2012). Bhojwani (2012) stated that the 
U.S. government instituted self-reporting to deter instances of misconduct. The 
mitigation steps have been ineffective because government lacks the ability to collect 
data, perform analysis, and report contractor performance in a shared environment 
(Bradshaw & Su, 2013). Bradshaw and Su (2013) believed the government has not 
emphasized monitoring performance but instead focused on establishing ethical 
contracting standards. Rogers (2010) believed the government’s focus was misguided. 
The government may require corporations to acknowledge ethical standards; however, a 
corporation’s ethical change emanates from within (Rogers, 2010). Rogers believed that 




Amirkhanyan, Kim, and Lambright (2010) believed even Roger’s ideas have not changed 
the environment because, despite the level of government involvement, contractor 
performance will not change. Influencing change within any organization or industry 
begins with understanding the different parts of the problem (Bell & Barkhuizen, 2011). 
Contractor Misconduct Influencers 
Government contractor misconduct has existed since government contracting 
began (Kean, 2011). Kean (2011) believed that understanding where misconduct 
originates is important to deterring future misconduct. Rogers (2010) found that the 
government contracting process promoted contractor misconduct. Sonn and 
Gebreselassie (2010) believed that government contractors condone misconduct to 
increase profitability. Roberts stated that the U.S. government enables contractor 
misconduct. 
Contracting process influences misconduct. Understanding the different parts 
of the government contracting misconduct atmosphere begins with understanding the 
different types of contractors (Wang & San Miguel, 2012). Wang and San Miguel (2012) 
determined that corporate ethics and corporate profits do not differ among diverse 
business segments and various sized corporation. Removing segment and size from the 
equation narrows the areas to create emphasis for change (Wang & San Miguel, 2012).  
The federal government contracting industry consists of both for-profit and 
nonprofit companies. Members of the public believe that nonprofits, or not-for-profit 
corporations, are trustworthy and less prone to misconduct than for-profit companies 




created an unbalanced government oversight program that handles for-profit and 
nonprofit corporations differently (Amirkhanyan, 2010). Amirkhanyan (2010) found that 
the public’s trust in nonprofits allows for a decreased government emphasis on 
performing contract oversight. The trust appears misplaced because nonprofit contractors 
self-report misconduct at a 25% higher rate than for-profit companies (Amirkhanyan, 
2010). There are focused efforts on oversight of for-profits while nonprofits are not a 
priority unless there is reason to suspect misconduct (Amirkhanyan, 2010). 
Government contracts range from purchases of less than $3,000 to contracts worth 
billions of dollars (Rogers, 2010). Less complex contracts require lower degrees of 
specialization, which in turn involves less government involvement and decreased 
government oversight (Amirkhanyan, 2010). Less government oversight increases 
opportunities for contractor misconduct to remain undetected and undeterred (Rogers, 
2010).  
Complex contracts require different contractors to team together to meet the 
government’s requirement (Amirkhanyan, 2010). Amirkhanyan (2010) said the 
government requires a bid response that consists of a prime contractor and a team of 
subcontractors. Prime contractors win contract awards based upon their teaming approach 
(Parker, 2010). Parker (2010) found that prime contractors take one of two actions once 
awarded a contract. Prime contractors may continue with the proposed teaming and 
perform tasks they are capable of while subcontracting selected services to other 
contractors as indicated in the proposal (Parker, 2010). However, prime contractors may 




Kidalov (2013) stated that prime contractors formed initial alliances for 
competition then severed the teaming relationship once awarded a contract. Severing 
subcontracts after a contract award complies with the FAR; however, severing fails to 
meet the contracting program’s intent (Kidalov, 2013). Severing teaming agreements 
counters the government’s intent to provide work to specialized subcontractors (Parker, 
2010).  
The prime/sub relationship makes contract oversight difficult (Rogers, 2010). The 
U.S. government requires prime contractors to monitor and report subcontractor 
performance (Kidalov, 2013). Moreover, Kidalov (2013) stated that prime contractors are 
responsible for subcontractor performance and subject to penalties for subcontractor 
misconduct.  
 Subcontracting increases the government’s exposure to misconduct by creating an 
additional oversight layer (Kidalov, 2013). Kidalov (2013) found instances of misconduct 
exist between a prime contractor and subcontractors, which included high overhead 
charges, improper pricing, improper payment, and improper distribution of work. Prime 
contractors may subcontract to individuals instead of companies to minimize their risk 
(Calvasina, Calvasina, & Calvasina, 2011). Moreover, Calvasina et al. (2010) believed 
that prime contractors subcontracted to individuals to reduce corporate overhead, create 
additional profits, and distance the corporation from employee misconduct liability.  
The types of contractor business models and teaming relationships are not the 
only segments of the government-contracting environment that invite misconduct (Mori 




processes provide opportunities for misconduct (Bradshaw & Su, 2013; Mori & Doni, 
2010). Contractor misconduct is not limited to awarded contracts but is present 
throughout the proposal and bidding processes (Mori & Doni, 2010).  
The government may inadvertently promote misconduct early in the contract bid 
process through the contract vehicle selection (Amey, 2012). Contract bundling, the 
combining of multiple contract requirements into one contract, exposes the government 
to increased risk of fraud, waste, and abuse (Demessie, 2012; Dorey et al., 2012). 
Demessie (2012) found that contract stacking and omnibus contracts create a limited 
contractor pool that increases the propensity for profit gouging due to intercompany 
agreements. Dorey et al. (2012) discovered that government contracts include financial 
incentives designed to reduce government risk by promoting the meeting of cost 
estimates and timelines. However, this tactic is not effective because contractors build in 
overestimates of time and expenses in a bid to ensure they can meet the requirements for 
incentives (Dorey et al, 2012). Contractors violate contract law when employees work 
off-book hours to meet timelines and expenses (Dorey et al., 2012). The government’s 
practice of short or limited response for proposal (RFP) times, as low as 5-days, limits the 
pool for respondents and increases the opportunities for response errors that lead 
contractor misconduct to hide the errors (Demessie, 2012).  
Jensen (2010) believed the government contract bidding process is difficult to 
navigate and led to contractor misunderstanding, which increased contract protests, 
contract violations, and accusations of misconduct. Problems related to the complex 




the electronic bidding process (Elmorshidy, 2012). Terman and Yang (2010) stated that 
government risk reduction efforts increased contractor misconduct. Contractors 
emphasize maximizing profits and reducing risk when replying to RFPs, which increases 
the government’s risk and cost (Amirkhanyan, 2010; Terman & Yang, 2010).  
Government contractors influence misconduct. The reasons for contractor 
misconduct extend past the contracting process (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). Deterring 
contractor misconduct requires the U.S. government create, impose, and enforce effective 
measures against misconduct (Roberts, 2010). Understanding the atmosphere of 
misconduct must include a review of how the federal government contracting industry 
and the U.S. government inadvertently promoted misconduct (Roberts, 2010). 
The SAM lists over 450,000 active registrants in the federal government 
contracting industry database (FPDS, 2014). All contractors are required to abide by the 
standards of ethical conduct outlined in the FAR (Roberts, 2010). Sonn and Gebreselassie 
(2010) believed that contractor misconduct would continue to exist if all contractors 
performed within the specifications outlined in certain government contracts. Calvasina 
(2011) discovered that contractors continued to operate within the government’s 
standards yet deceived government organizations by misclassifying employees, resulting 
in billions of dollars in lost tax revenue. Sonn and Gebreselassie found that government 
contractors violated employee pay and benefits regulations by paying less than the 
required living wage.  
Larger contracting organizations may have complex organizational structures 




from subcontracting requirements (Thomas, 2012). Contractors provided incentives for 
employees to develop personal relationships with influential government employees to 
solicit unpublished information on contracting efforts (Roberts, 2010). Roberts (2010) 
found that contractors used personal relationships to give government employees gifts, 
which circumvented the FAR’s gifting prohibition.  
The U.S. government attempted to decrease costs through increased competition; 
however, increased contractor competition did not improve contractor performance 
(Terman & Yang, 2010). Terman and Yang (2010) found that contractors decreased cost 
estimates to receive contract awards then increased costs once awarded the contract; 
thereby decreasing efficiency and increasing costs beyond projections. Thomas (2012) 
described contractor deception that included companies with reputations for misconduct 
that renamed and rebranded the organization; thereby, masking their negative history. 
Uhoka (2013) believed that continued U.S. government attempts to influence contractor 
ethical behavior are futile and that industry and corporate norms alone determine 
corporate ethical behavior.  
The U.S. government influences misconduct. Roberts (2010) argued that while 
the U.S. government attempts to reduce misconduct, the government also fosters 
contractor misconduct. Roberts found that senior government officials and military 
officers transition to government contractor executive positions. Contractor incestuous 
hiring practices skirt the FAR rules regarding the hiring of government employees and 
create a propensity for operating outside ethical boundaries (Roberts, 2010). The FAR 




(Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). Hansson and Holmgren (2011) believed circumventing the 
FAR minimized cost savings and efficiencies, while increasing the potential for 
contracting misconduct.  
Restrictive or noncompetitive contracting actions increase the government’s risk 
for misconduct (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). The U.S. government historically awards 
20% of all contract efforts to the top five government contractors (Warnock, 2012). 
Reliance on small numbers of contractors makes it difficult to enforce responsibility 
standards (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). Dependence on a select few coupled with 
familiarity created an atmosphere where government procurement agents show favoritism 
and give preferential treatment to select contractors (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). 
Presidential administrations increase influence and power of the government contracting 
industry by encouraging consolidation and mergers of contractors and further limiting 
choices (Hayden et al., 2010). 
Government officials influence contract awards beyond limiting competition 
(Lewis & Bajari, 2011). The U.S. government contributed to misconduct by selecting 
lower-cost bids (Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). The government transitioned from the 
low-bid strategy after determining that awarding to the lowest-bidder contributed to the 
problem of contractor misconduct (Elyamany & Abdelrahman, 2010). Lewis and Bajari 
(2011) found the U.S. government changed the awardee selection criteria from lowest 
bidder to the lowest qualified bidder; however, the lowest qualified bidder failed to 




The U.S. government transitioned to awarding contracts on the best value criteria, 
which assigns values to criteria including price, technical approach, management plan, 
and past performance (Elyamany & Abdelrahman, 2010). Elyamany and Abdelrahman 
(2010) believed the best-value selection method discriminated against new and smaller 
firms and fostered contractor misconduct. Bradshaw and Su (2013) found that 
government procurement placed less emphasis upon a contractor’s past performance and 
more on a promise of performance. Procurement officials viewed past performance as a 
pass-or-fail and not a graduated scale (Bradshaw & Su, 2013). 
The contract award process may foster misconduct; however, some contract 
vehicles require contractor misconduct (Krishnan, 2011). Moreover, the U.S. government 
condones and contributes to government contractor misconduct (Krishnan, 2011). The 
U.S. government knowingly contracts services in an effort to undermine accountability 
for unethical and illegal techniques and tactics involved in intelligence gathering 
(Krishnan, 2011). Moreover, Krishnan (2011) stated that government requested that 
contractors create false reports to justify a desired outcome. 
The U.S. government encouraged unethical behavior in companies by requesting 
contractors to perform illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance services 
(Greengard, 2010). The U.S. government’s intelligence community (IC) promotes 
corruption, inefficiency, and unethical practices, while shielding the contractor from 
federal oversight and control (Greengard, 2010). Greengard (2010) determined that the 




contracts with U.S. telecommunication corporations that provided the government with 
illegal access to private information.  
The U.S. government promoted contractor misconduct by condoning unethical 
behaviors (Gomez del Prado, 2011). Moreover, the U.S. government employed private 
security contractors to distance the administration from hazardous policing and 
peacekeeping situations (Gomez del Prado, 2011). Gomez del Prado (2011) found that 
the security firms have committed violent and deadly acts resulting in poor cultural 
relations and politically embarrassing situation for the U.S. government.  
Private security firms have changed since 2001 by shifting from security guard 
services to a mercenary role (Gomez del Prado, 2011). The U.S. government’s spending 
on private security contracts has increased with the shifting in roles (Gomez del Prado, 
2011). Gomez del Prado (2011) stated that the cost of security contractor misconduct 
extended past money to lives and international goodwill. Private security contractors 
were for-profit businesses that seek maximum profitability, which caused contractor 
misconduct ranging from unauthorized use of deadly force, to acts of fraud, and 
falsifying documents (Gomez del Prado, 2011).  
  The U.S. government’s inability to correct misconduct may be as harmful as 
condoning misconduct (Mayrell, 2012). The U.S. government provides no defined 
requirement for what constitutes an acceptable ethics program, and does not require the 
contractor to submit the program for approval (Roberts, 2010). The lack of defined 
requirements and contract vehicle complexity may render the government incapable of 




recover as much lost revenue as possible (Mayrell, 2012). Furthermore, the U.S. 
government may choose contract expiration over termination because the burden of proof 
extends beyond contractor performance and includes the ability to improve (Loulakis, 
2010). Warnock (2012) believed political agendas, biased enforcement of contracting 
rules and regulations, and poor oversight compromise the U.S. government’s ability to 
influence contractor misconduct.  
Deterring Government Contractor Misconduct 
Paternoster (2010) stated that deterrence theory is preventing illegal or unethical 
acts through the threat of penalties for violations. O’Neil (2011) credited the U.S. 
government’s nuclear deterrence policy of mutual assured destruction for preventing war 
during the late 20
th
 century. The nuclear deterrence policy was effective because the 
Soviet Union believed the U.S. government watched for violations, could affect mutual 
destruction, and would enforce the policy (O’Neil, 2011).  
In government contracting, the U.S. government seeks to create an ethical 
contracting atmosphere where contracting officials and contractors follow the rules and 
strive to decrease costs and increase efficiency (Rogers, 2010). The U.S. government 
creates rules, regulations, and guidance to establish ethical contracting business practices 
(Rogers, 2010). Rogers (2010) believed that government contractor misconduct continues 
despite the U.S. government’s deterrent actions. Best (2013) believed that effective 
misconduct deterrent programs consist of prevention, detection, and prosecution. 
Furthermore, compromising any of the three elements will result in an ineffective 




The U.S. government’s misconduct deterrence program includes rules and 
regulations governing conduct, oversight in the execution of the contracted requirements, 
and punishment for violations (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010). Problems exist with the U.S. 
government’s current approach because establishing ethical rules and regulations does 
not guarantee change in unethical behavior (Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, Roberts (2010) 
stated that misconduct would continue to increase without a stringent government 
oversight program. The U.S. government’s methods for identifying contractor 
misconduct are ineffective, and determining responsible contractor behavior is difficult 
(Roberts, 2010; Warnock, 2012). Enforcing misconduct violations is problematic and 
fosters a legal environment where settlement and compromise are preferred (Young, 
2010). 
Government contractor oversight. Contractor oversight programs are vital in 
the effort to deter misconduct (Thomas, 2012). Dickinson (2013) argued that oversight is 
the foundation for accountability and prosecutions, and therefore a vital component of 
deterrence. Oversight programs may prevent and detect misconduct, while informing 
those responsible for enforcing policy (Best, 2013). Contractor oversight is one of the 
government’s essential elements in deterring misconduct (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010).  
The U.S. government performs contractor oversight in multiple ways. The 
government appoints officials to provide contractor oversight (Butts, 2010). The U.S. 
government outsources oversight to contractors and requires contractors to self-perform 
oversight and report violations (Roberts, 2010). Dickinson (2013) believed that contractor 




prosecute misconduct. Observed and reported acts of misconduct inform the prosecutorial 
phase of a deterrence program (Dickinson, 2013).  
Effective deterrence programs require that individuals believe others will discover 
their misconduct (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). Ritchey and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) found 
that the effectiveness of government-imposed speed limits to reduce speeding increased 
as the number of highway patrol personnel increased. Moreover, the perception was that 
the probability of detection affected behavior (Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011).  
Best (2013) stated that an effective oversight program is essential for deterring 
government contractor misconduct. However, Sonn and Gebreselassie (2010) believed 
the government does a poor job of contractor oversight. Kilbride (2010) believed the U.S. 
government is capable of improving contractor oversight through increased reviews of 
contractors and contractor operations, which would reduce threat of contractor 
misconduct. Terman and Yang (2010) found that the government seldom meets their 
contract monitoring responsibilities; thereby increasing the likelihood of contractor 
misconduct. Kilbride linked the U.S. government’s shortfalls in oversight to funding that 
did not keep pace with contract spending. Furthermore, money saved through less 
funding for oversight programs is lost through acts of contractor misconduct (Kilbride, 
2010). 
Government programs and acquisition regulations make government contractor 
oversight operations difficult (Amey, 2012). The government’s self-imposed time limit 
on contract audits is an example of policies that increased the government’s risk to 




complexity of the contracting relationship determines the amount of oversight the 
government maintains.  
Mori and Doni (2010) believed the increasing complexity of government contract 
construction increases the difficulty of monitoring contractor performance and reliance 
on contractor self-reporting. Specialized contracts involve stronger governmental 
relationships with the contractor and require increased oversight; however, lower degrees 
of specialization result in decreased government oversight (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010). 
Decreased government oversight, coupled with lack of institutional oversight and 
discipline, creates the potential for contractor misconduct to go undetected and 
unchecked (Amey, 2012). Deciding how much oversight, and how the oversight will be 
conducted, is determined by U.S. government contracting officials (Butts, 2010). 
Contracting officials may determine the particulars of contract oversight programs 
but contracting officer representatives (COR) or contracting officer technical 
representatives (COTR) perform the oversight (Butts, 2010). Contracting officials receive 
training in contract law, contract administration, and contractor oversight (Karstrom, 
2013). Government overseers are technically competent, versed in the technical aspects 
of a contract, and able to provide proper oversight (Karstrom, 2013).  
Butts (2010), unlike Karstrom (2013), believed government overseers, such as the 
COR or COTR, are incapable of performing oversight. CORs are contract specialists not 
technically proficient enough to provide proper oversight; COTRs, by contrast, are 
technically proficient yet not trained in contract administration (Butts, 2010). Improperly 




human rights abuses in the Abu Ghraib military prison in 2004 (Krishnan, 2011). The 
oversight ability gaps increase because CORs and COTRs have legal authority over the 
contract yet lack legal supervisory authority over contractors (Krishnan, 2011).  
Government supervisors should notify CORs of suspected contractor misconduct 
(Judd, 2012). CORs should notify the government contractor executives, which have 
legal authority over the individual contractor (Butts, 2010; Judd, 2012). Butts (2010) 
believed the relationships between CORs, COTRs, and contractors are dysfunctional due 
to serving different shareholders. The CORs and COTRs serve the U.S. government and 
the American taxpayers, while contractors serve the corporation and corporate 
shareholders (Butts, 2010).  
The U.S. government implemented electronic record keeping for improved 
oversight of contractor performance but the system is only as good as the information it 
contains (Elmorshidy, 2012). Government organizations seldom share contractor 
information despite the emphasis on centralized reporting of contractor performance 
(Terman & Yang, 2010). Contracting officials' increased workloads result in lax 
recordkeeping and diminished effectiveness of the electronic system (Elmorshidy, 2012).  
Issues other than technical ability and workload negatively affect the U.S. 
government’s oversight program (Boerner, 2011; Krishnan, 2011). The U.S. government 
contracts services to decrease costs and increase efficiency; however, inadequate 
oversight compromises these goals (Best, 2013; Roberts, 2010). The advanced 
technology and secrecy involved in intelligence collection makes government monitoring 




government could not account for 25% of Department of Defense (DoD) spending. 
Boerner (2011) discussed the failure of existing government oversight and prosecution 
initiatives involving medical contractors where two cases were prosecuted despite $1 
billion in improper payments.  
 The U.S. government expanded contractor oversight to include government 
involvement with authority beyond contracting officials, CORs, and COTRs 
(Elmorshidy, 2012). The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) oversees both 
prime contractor and subcontractor performance (Lessack, 2013). Lessack (2013) found 
the OFFCP’s oversight included contract employee wages, corporate hiring practices, and 
the applicant interview process. The OFFCP issues a list of best practices and 
recommendations for contractor performance to avoid potential misconduct allegations 
(Lessack, 2013). Lessack found that the OFFCP cites instances of contractor misconduct; 
however, they recommend enforcement actions and do not prosecute misconduct.  
The government relies on contractors to perform oversight on themselves and 
other contractors (Roberts, 2010; Young, 2012). The U.S. government has outsourced 
specialized contract oversight to government contractors (Young, 2012). Furthermore, 
Stegman (2010) found the government outsources the auditing of medical laboratory 
claims to increase efficiency. The FAR requires contractors to create ethics programs and 
corporate compliance positions to perform internal oversight (Roberts, 2010). Stegman 
believed that requiring corporate positions and programs is not enough because corporate 
compliance officers are not trained in auditing and incapable of monitoring compliance. 




contractor misconduct would continue unabated. Moreover, increasing oversight does not 
guarantee reduced misconduct (Amirkhanyan et al., 2010). 
U.S. government deterrent steps and programs. The U.S. government requires 
documented business ethics and conduct policies for contractors awarded contracts worth 
more than $5 million (Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, the government requires all large 
contractors to have a functioning corporate ethics program (Roberts, 2010). Roberts 
(2010) stated that these programs and policies are implemented to reduce the costs 
associated with contractor misconduct.  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) attempted to improve contractor 
performance, reduce fraud, and deter instances of misconduct by strengthening and 
enforcing standards and regulations (Healthcare Financial Management Association 
[HFM], 2011). The U.S. government’s handling of misconduct enforcement appears 
inconsistent (HFM, 2011; Tillipman, 2013). Government officials believed that 
contractors guilty of misconduct should be punished without regard for circumstances 
(Tillipman, 2013). However, government officials maintained that considering self-
reporting, type of misconduct, and contractor viability survivability, are important during 
the deterrent prosecutorial process (Tillipman, 2013).  
Government contracting officers are responsible for a contract’s administration, 
modification, and termination (Judd, 2012). Moreover, the U.S. government provides 
contractors the ability to elevate a contracting officer’s decision to an appellate body 
(Judd, 2012). Judd (2012) found that the U.S. government’s own Court of Federal Claims 




terminations or nonrenewals. The CFC and BCA have standards for supporting punitive 
contracting actions. Judd believed the CFC’s and BCA’s standards promote seeking a 
compromise solution that is acceptable to both parties.  
The compromise solutions appear sufficient; however, compromising rules, 
regulations, and prescribed punitive actions may reduce the desired deterrent effect (Best, 
2013). Best (2013) illustrated this belief with an example of corporate deception and 
fraud. A large government contractor formed a joint venture with a Service Disabled 
Veteran Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) to win a SDVOSB set-aside contract award 
(Best, 2013). The FAR (2014) requires that an SDVOSB company receive over 50% of 
the tasks. In Best’s example, the SDVOSB received less than 1% of the work. The 
contract termination was overturned and the BCA settled with the joint venture. The 
Veterans Administration has since reported that fraud and abuse of the SDVOSB 
program continues to be a major problem (Best, 2013). Best surmised that the legislative 
changes in verification, designed for making debarment or suspension easier, and for 
increasing misconduct penalties, were compromised by settlements.  
 The government provides legislative bodies outside of the CFC and CBA that 
work to determine contractor accountability (Loulakis & McLaughlin, 2013). Each 
legislative body uses unique parameters in determining accountability. The Armed Forces 
Board of Contract Appeals reviews all contractor appeals in cases of government 
penalties and takes performance, impact on the federal government, and impact on the 
contractor into consideration during deliberations (Loulakis, 2010). Members of the 




must go beyond the individual act of misconduct or nonperformance and show the 
contractor did not act in good faith (Loulakis & McLaughlin, 2011).  
The measure of in good faith is subjective and difficult to prove or disprove 
(Loulakis & McLaughlin, 2011). The U.S. Court of Federal Claims established that 
misconduct alone is not sufficient for sanctions against a federal contractor (Loulakis & 
McLaughlin, 2013). Loulakis and McLaughlin (2013) determined that intent to perform 
acts of misconduct must be present for the government to take action against a contractor. 
Detractors in deterring contractor misconduct exist beyond compromise and 
settlement (Brown, 2010; Cea & Stempler, 2010). The government subsidizes legal 
challenges to contract deterrent actions (Brown, 2010). The FAR (2014) allows for 
government reimbursement to contractors for breach of contract lawsuits. Financial 
reimbursement is a win-win for the contractor (Brown, 2010). Brown (2010) found that 
contractors are authorized to receive government reimbursement for legal fees and 
settlement costs in cases of fraud against third parties. Protesting contract awards 
increased due to increased competition and favorable consideration for protesting 
expenses (Cea & Stempler, 2010). The U.S. government provides financial 
reimbursement for contractor employee-based lawsuit settlements (Brown, 2010). 
Furthermore, Brown found that the financial reimbursement for employee-based lawsuit 
settlements included the contractor’s legal fees and settlement costs. The government’s 
current reimbursement policies promote misconduct through subsidized legal expenses 




Compromising government-imposed prosecutorial steps extends to holding 
contractors accountable for intent and action (Cea & Stempler, 2010; Dorey et al., 2012). 
Holding contractors accountable and responsible for providing what they promise, at the 
price at which they promise, promotes realistic cost estimates and reduces actual 
contracting costs (Dorey et al., 2012). The U.S. government seldom penalizes contractors 
for underestimating costs (Dorey et al., 2012). Dorey et al. (2012) stated that when 
contractors present added costs, the government may cancel the contract initiative, restart 
the contract bid process, or pay the added costs. Dorey et al. believed the three options 
present a loss of value regardless; therefore, the government requires weighing the cost 
against the timeline and viability of the initiative before deciding the next step.  
The U.S. government does not allow contractors to lose money on a contract; at 
worst, contractors make no profit (FAR, 2014). The absence of contractor risk creates the 
incentive to underestimate the perceived cost and increase the estimate after beginning 
the work (Dorey et al., 2012). The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
requires that cost estimates be within 80% of actual costs; however, Dorey et al. (2012) 
believed that Congress’s attempts to solve the cost estimate problem fail to address 
contractors that submit cost proposals.  
Underestimated contract costs are a type of purposeful contractor practice 
designed to deceive the government and increase government contractor profits (Dorey et 
al., 2012). Contractor fraudulent practices, following contract award, include improper 
pricing and fraudulent billing practices (Martin, 2013). Fraudulent pricing strategies have 




The False Claims Act (FCA) is a Civil War era statute designed to hold 
government contractors accountable for fraud (Martin, 2013). Martin (2013) found that 
through enforcing the FCA, the U.S. government recouped an average of $3 billion 
annually from 2009 to 2012. FCA-enforced settlements included government contractors 
Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), Honeywell International, and Armor Holdings (Martin, 
2013). The FCA provides financial incentives for private parties to report contractor acts 
of misconduct by allocating a reward of up to 30% of any monies recovered (Roberts, 
2010). The FCA’s punitive actions extend beyond the government contracting company 
to the individual level (Martin, 2013). Martin stated that the FCA’s individual punitive 
actions include contracting industry executive and employee fines, imprisonment, or 
both.  
 The legislative bodies of the CFC and BCA, as well as legislative reforms like the 
Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act or the FCA, are the U.S. government’s 
attempts to deter contractor misconduct (Martin, 2013; Maser & Thompson, 2011; Titolo, 
2011). The Competition in Contracting Act established the GAO’s authority to decide all 
contract protests (Maser & Thompson, 2011). Protests can arise for a variety of reasons 
and include contractor misconduct during the contract bid or award phase (Maser & 
Thompson, 2011).  
The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) empowered both 
private citizens and the U.S. government to each have a role in policing contractor 




(Titolo, 2011). However, Titolo (2011) found that, in 2009, private citizens’ reports led to 
$2.4 billion in recovered contractor misconduct assets.  
In 2009, the Close the Contractor Fraud Loophole Act required federal 
government contractors began to self-report misconduct (Warnock, 2012). Additionally, 
in 2009, Congress established the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity 
Information System (FAPIIS) as a component of The Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2009 (Nackman et al., 2011). FAPIIS provides the government 
equivalent to POGO’s Federal Contractor Misconduct Database (FCMD) that began in 
2002 (Stanley, 2012). FAPIIS began as a government-only site in 2009; however, in 
2010, Congress required including contractor self-reporting and public access (Stanley, 
2012). FAPIIS assists contracting officials in choosing ethical contractors by providing 
access to a consolidated contractor performance database (Willard, 2013). However, the 
lack of detailed analysis of the information provided by FAPIIS renders the system 
useless (Willard, 2013).  
The Close the Contractor Fraud Loophole Act caused members of the FAR 
Council to change the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) in 2009 (FAR, 2008). The 
change was designed to deter contractor misconduct (Dorey et al., 2012). The change 
included mandatory contractor requirements for self-reporting of contractor misconduct, 
creating ethics and compliance programs, and employee ethics and conduct training 
programs (FAR, 2008). Furthermore, the FAR change included possible debarment or 
suspension for discovered misconduct violations up to 3 years after a contract ended 




The government established the Truth-in-Negotiations Act to reduce contract 
costs through proper bidding and increased competition (Roberts, 2010). Roberts (2010) 
found that contractors conspired together during the bidding process to ensure a higher 
price point; thereby rendering the Truth-in-Negotiations Act ineffective. Furthermore, 
Rogers (2010) mentioned the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as a method of ensuring 
contractors establish policies regarding employee wage requirements, work hour 
limitations, employee treatment, and employee working conditions.  
The Procurement Integrity Act of 1988 (PIA) prohibited government contract 
employees and others from providing information outside of the proposal process 
(Roberts, 2010). Contractors may be debarred, and individuals held civilly and criminally 
liable for misconduct violating the PIA (Roberts, 2010). Tillipman (2013) stated that 
debarment is the most severe government action available. Criminal convictions for 
misconduct have a pointed effect, whereas debarment affects the entire contracting 
company (Tillipman, 2013). Tillipman cautioned the necessity of serving the public 
interest prior to instituting debarment and suspension. Tillipman believed that debarment 
and suspension applied to contractors that do not take action internally against employees 
guilty of misconduct. 
The U.S. government’s contractor misconduct deterrent initiatives included 
contracting rules and regulations, along with legislative bodies and acts (Best, 2013). 
However, Best (2013) believed that the U.S. government promoted contractor 
misconduct. The Reinvestment Recovery Act of 2009 funded $275 billion in additional 




growth (Masino & McCurry, 2011). Masino and McCurry (2011) believed government 
contracts funded by the Reinvestment Recovery Act fell outside of the FAR and other 
government contracting regulations. Therefore, the lack of government regulatory 
authority made enforcing contractor misconduct difficult (Best, 2013; Masino & 
McCurry, 2011). 
 President Reagan spearheaded the effort promoting contractor self-regulation 
(Roberts, 2010). President Reagan believed that contractors could regulate their ethical 
behavior by instituting internal rules and organizations designed to improved ethical 
behavior (Roberts, 2010). Roberts (2010) reported that in 2009, the U.S. government 
began requiring government contractors to self-report misconduct violations to deter 
contractor misconduct. Martin (2013) found that private citizens report more instances of 
contractor misconduct than the federal government detected, which made self-reporting 
appealing. The U.S. government increased reliance on contractor self-reporting by 
relying on prime contractors to self-report subcontracting participation and misconduct 
violations for all subcontractors (Kidalov, 2013).  
The self-reporting requirement has critics (Thomas, 2012). Tillipman (2013) 
found that the self-reporting requirement applies to all contractors. However, Thomas 
(2012) believed that self-reporting requirements were responsible for some contractors 
failing due to the lack of infrastructure or funding for the monitoring software or services 
required. Kidalov (2013) believed that the U.S. government’s dependence upon 
contractors’ self-reporting derogatory information on themselves and fellow contractors 




The government’s self-reporting initiative included requiring contractors to list 
past performance pertinent to the contract they are bidding (FAR, 2014). Bradshaw and 
Su (2013) found that contractors selectively list past performance, including positive 
reviews and omitting unfavorable reviews. Moreover, Clarke (2010) believed that 
contractors omit or deceive when reporting unethical behavior. Kidalov (2013) found that 
instances of contractor misconduct were double the self-reported misconduct for 
hurricane Katrina recovery contracts. 
 Contractor self-reporting and other forms of oversight are ineffective if 
misconduct is not prosecuted (Warnock, 2012). Warnock (2012) believed the government 
should seek to reduce contracting costs through enforcement of ethical contractor 
standards. Contract standards and corporate ethics programs inform and educate; 
however, they do not prevent unethical behavior (Sadler-Smith, 2012). Corporate ethics 
programs require external oversight, including government audits (Boerner, 2011). 
Internally, organizational compliance programs require reviewing and updating to ensure 
maximum effectiveness (Boerner, 2011). Martin (2013) cited the federal court system’s 
inconsistency in interpreting and enforcing contractor self-reporting requirements. 
  Certain cases of contractor misconduct, such as hostile work environment and 
employment discrimination, require internal prosecution (Mayrell, 2012). The 
government’s diminished ability to enforce contractor ethical behavior standards reduces 
the probability of contractor compliance (Martin, 2013). Deceptive practices within the 




adjust the self-reporting processes to include a government verification process (Best 
2013). 
Summary 
The governing, safety, and security of U.S. citizens are governmental functions 
that the U.S. government should not outsource (Krishnan, 2011). However, the drive to 
reduce the expense of keeping all governmental functions in-house creates a need to look 
elsewhere for support (Terman & Yang, 2010). The U.S. government seeks to reduce 
costs and improve efficiency through employing federal government contractors 
(Hansson & Holmgren, 2011). The U.S. government’s contracting for goods and services 
is essential to the continuity of government and vital to the national economy (Jenks, 
2010; Masino & McCurry, 2011).  
The U.S. government’s inability to function without contractors has diminished 
the ability to control contractor misconduct (Knoll, 2011). The U.S. government’s 
dependence upon contracting caused many, such as Senator McCaskill, to believe that the 
government's deterrent steps do not restrain government contractor misconduct 
(Tillipman, 2013). The government contracting industry lobby wields power and 
influence throughout the branches of the government, thus creating a more profitable 
contracting environment (Hayden et al., 2010). Kilbride (2010) stated that government 
contractors are self-focused, profit-driven, and loyal to their companies instead of their 
country. Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) believed contracting government services does not 
reduce cost or maximize efficiency because contractors do not pursue innovation without 




The U.S. government’s concern with saving money is contrary to the government 
contracting industries' desire to maximize profits (Hansson & Holmgren, 2011; Kean, 
2011). Sadler-Smith (2012) believed that humans make all decisions by processing 
information and choosing what is beneficial. The government exercised Sadler-Smith’s 
belief and provided financial incentives to promote cost-effectiveness within the general 
population (Litsa, Petropoulos, & Nikolopoulos, 2012). Lewis and Bajari (2011) believed 
that a similar financial incentive program would reduce contractor misconduct. 
Furthermore, rewarding contractors that exceed contract requirements and penalizing 
contractors that do not meet contract requirements would reduce contractor misconduct 
(Lewis & Bajari, 2011). Lewis and Bajari believed that incentive program enforcement is 
more important than incentive size.  
The U.S. government’s deterrent actions towards government contractor 
misconduct may result in increasingly complex contracting processes (Nagle, 2010). 
Moreover, the complexity created by increased rules, regulations, and legislative actions 
influences efficiency (Nagle, 2010). Terman and Yang (2010) determined that 
contracting complexity led the government to monitor only 20% of government contracts 
annually. Young (2010) believed government regulations and requirements documents, 
filled with vague wording, make enforcement difficult and settlement preferable. 
Throughout the last 100 years, legal volumes on government contracting guidelines have 
increased from one volume covering the entire topic to individual volumes on dozens of 




Roberts (2010) reported that misconduct decreased in the late 1990s to late 2000s 
despite a doubling of contract spending; however, Roberts suspected the reduction in 
reported misconduct was due to the decrease in oversight and accountability. Sonn and 
Gebreslassie (2010) believed creating new federal contracting legislation would not 
improve contractor behavior. However, the GAO believed that strengthening standards 
and regulations would improve contractor performance, while reducing fraud and other 
instances of misconduct (HFM, 2011).  
Terman and Yang (2010) surmised that U.S. government contracting would 
continue to thrive despite contractor misconduct and a lack of government monitoring. 
Sonn and Gebreselassie (2010) found evidence supporting Terman and Yang’s position 
that unethical government contractors continue to win contract awards despite repeated 
acts of misconduct. Tillipman (2013) believed the current government contracting system 
effectively reduces contractor misconduct. Roberts (2010) found evidence supporting 
Tillipman’s belief because contractor misconduct rates decreased from the late 1990s to 
late 2000s. 
U.S. government contracting and contractor misconduct began during the 
Revolutionary War; however, the effect of government policies on contractor decisions 
and behavior is unknown (Parker, 2010; Roberts, 2010). The academic community lacks 
information on topics to include contracting and contractor misconduct (Wang & San 
Miguel, 2012). In this study, I added to the academic research by studying the deterrent 
effect of the change to the FAR in 2009 on reported government contractor misconduct 




Transition and Summary 
 Section 1 established the foundation for the business study. The section began by 
presenting the study’s foundation and background of why government contractor 
misconduct is a problem. The section next detailed the problem statement, purpose 
statement, and nature of the study. Section 1 contained the stated research question and 
associated hypotheses statements. The theoretical foundation is deterrence theory and a 
list of defined terms was included in the section. Section 1 continued with a discussion of 
the study’s assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. The significance of the study 
followed with discussions on reducing the gaps in literature concerning the deterrent 
effect of government actions towards contractor misconduct. Section 1 concluded with a 
review of the professional literature that established the academic foundation for the 
study.  
 Section 2 details the research phase of the project. The section begins with a 
restatement of the study’s purpose. Section 2 continues by defining the role of the 
researcher, and explaining the rational for selecting the participants, population, and 
sampling methods. The section presented the reasoning behind choosing the study’s 
research method and design. Section 2 concludes with details concerning the data 
analysis technique and address reliability and validity. Section 3 presents the overall 
study and study results. The section begins with an overview of the study and 
presentation of findings. The section presents the implications for business practices and 
social change. Section 3 concludes with recommendations for action and further study, as 




Section 2: The Project 
In the study, I sought to discover if the U.S. government’s actions designed to 
deter federal government contracting misconduct were effective. The U.S. government’s 
use of contractors to conduct inherent governmental functions continues to increase 
despite continued instances of contractor misconduct and the widespread belief that 
governmental deterrent steps do not restrain government contractor misconduct (Jenks, 
2010; Knoll, 2011; Tillipman, 2013). The following discussion details the rationale 
behind and framework for the study’s research phase. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-
comparative study was to (a) discover if the U.S. government’s change in 2009 to the 
FAR has reduced the rate of reported contractor misconduct and (b) investigate the 
impact of the change to the FAR in 2009 on federal government contractor ethics 
business processes. The rate of reported government contractor misconduct and 
government contractor ethics business processes were the two dependent variables. The 
study presented secondary quantitative research collected from 2006 through 2012, 
statistical contracting misconduct information collected from 2006 through 2012, 
contracting articles, and government contracting studies.  
Through data collection and analysis, I sought to determine if a causal 
relationship existed between the change to the FAR in 2009 and the number of reported 
acts of contractor misconduct by government contractors and government contractor 




from 2006 through 2008 (Time 1) and from 2010 through 2012 (Time 2). I sought to 
determine if the government’s efforts in 2009 to deter contractor misconduct significantly 
reduced the reported instance of government contractor misconduct and influenced 
government contractor ethics business processes. The study findings indicated that the 
change to the FAR in 2009 did not effectively reduce instances of reported contractor 
misconduct; however, the findings did indicate that the change to the FAR significantly 
influenced government contractor ethics business processes. 
Role of the Researcher 
My role as researcher for this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-
comparative study was determined by the study’s research method, research design, and 
data collection method (DeForge, 2010). The primary research role was to collect data 
from credible sources. Yu-Jia (2012) stated that assuring resource credibility is the 
researcher’s responsibility.  
The U.S. government provides online, publically available, and archival 
information pertaining to contract awards and contractor misconduct. Online databases 
include FAPIIS, SAM, and POGO. I did not collect unverified misconduct information 
due to the unreliability of the information. I collected and organized data in a format 
compatible to IBM SPSS Statistics Grad Pack version 20.0. I analyzed the data collected, 
inferred results from the research and analysis, and recommended future research related 
to contractor misconduct. 
I have 20 years of experience working with government contractors. I have 10 




included supervising government contractors, reviewing invoices, evaluating contractor 
performance, and reporting contractor noncompliance to the applicable contracting 
officer. I have 10 years of experience as a government contractor. My government 
contractor duties included procurement services, shipping and receiving, maintenance, 
engineering services, operational planning, research and development, analysis, and 
program management. My experiences as a government customer, a COTR, and a 
government contractor create a balanced understanding of federal contractor misconduct. 
Participants 
 Participants were not required for this study. I collected all required research data 
from two U.S. government databases, SAM and FAPIIS, the government sponsored 
database POGO, and official FPDS reports. The three databases contained publically 
available information that included government contract awards, contractor performance, 
and contractor misconduct. The information was compatible with SPSS. I correlated the 
data by year and by contractor. The yearly breakdown included two groups. The first 
group (preintervention) includes data from 2006 through 2008. The second group 
(postintervention) includes data from 2010 through 2012. Contractors were limited to the 
top 100 federal contractors by contract awards as listed in FPDS.  
Research Method and Design 
I intended to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 affected reported 
government contractor misconduct (dependent variable) and the government contractor 
ethics business process (dependent variable). Reported government contractor 




variable while the 3-year groups, pre and post the change to the FAR in 2009, comprised 
the independent variable. The quantitative research method and retrospective causal-
comparative design was preferred because of the ex post facto cause-and-effect 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable (Brewer & 
Kuhn, 2010; Yu-Jia, 2012). Furthermore, statistically measuring the independent variable 
made causal-comparative the best design choice (Kraska, 2010). 
Method 
I used quantitative methodology to conduct my study of change to the FAR in 
2009 on rates of reported government contractor misconduct, and contractor ethics 
business processes, from 2006 through 2012. Quantitative methodology produces 
descriptive results that measure numerical changes in the characteristics of a chosen 
population (Kraska, 2010). Hypothesis testing determines if significant change has 
occurred in quantitative methodology (Kraska, 2010). Kraska (2010) believed that 
researchers use numerical and statistical results to infer generalized conclusions in 
quantitative methodology. Researchers using qualitative methodology, unlike quantitative 
methodology, rely on philosophical principles and not on numerical data for interpreting 
results and providing reasoned conclusions (Staller, 2010; Weathers et al., 2011). 
Qualitative researchers filter information through their values and beliefs that become 
part of the analysis; however, quantitative researchers use statistical analysis without 
inserting additional personal values into the analysis process (Kraska, 2010; Staller, 
2010). My study included previously collected numerical data for inferring conclusions, 





Selecting a research methodology was my first step in determining the study’s 
design. Choosing quantitative methodology for my study led to selecting the appropriate 
design. I selected nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-comparative design. 
 Quantitative methodology designs can be experimental, quasi-experimental, or 
nonexperimental in design (DeForge, 2010). DeForge (2010) stated that researchers do 
not manipulate variables in nonexperimental design; however, researchers do manipulate 
variables in both quasi-experimental and experimental design. My study consisted of 
historical data that render variable manipulation impossible, thus making 
nonexperimental design the only acceptable quantitative design.  
Nonexperimental design is preferred when researching a large group or when 
measuring the effectiveness of a program (Lobmeier, 2010). My study was designed to 
measure the U.S. government’s contractor misconduct deterrence program effectiveness 
in a large population totaling more than 450,000 registered contracting companies. 
Nonexperimental design consists of a number of different types of more narrowly 
focused designs including comparative design, causal-comparative design, correlational 
design, and one-group pretest-posttest design (Lobmeier, 2010).  
Researchers use comparative design to compare two or more groups and 
determine statistically significant differences (Lobmeier, 2010). Lobmeier (2010) stated 
that retroactive causal-comparative design is an ex post facto design that researchers use 
to compare differences in one or more groups before and after a manipulating a variable. 




determines if a relationship exists with a correlational design (Lobmeier, 2010). 
Researchers select a one-group, pretest-posttest design to measure differences in a group 
over time, with one measure before and one measure after manipulating a variable 
(Lobmeier, 2010).  
In my study, I compared the differences in reported federal contractor misconduct 
before and after the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 2009. The single group of 
federal government contractors made selecting either comparative design or correlational 
design untenable. I compared the median for a 3-year period before and the mean a 3-
year period after an intervention. Siami and Gorji (2011) conducted a causal-comparative 
study of a telecommunications company using ex post facto data to infer a cause-and-
effect relationship. Liang, Fulmer, Majerich, Clevenstine, and Howanski (2012) selected 
causal-comparative design to measure differences between two groups over an 8-year 
period. The ex post facto nature, single participant group, and multiyear comparison were 
components of my study’s causal-comparative design. 
Population and Sampling 
Individuals were not required to participate in the study. I collected historical data 
on reported federal government contractor misconduct from 2006 through 2008 and from 
2010 through 2012 in my ex post facto research design. POGO employees collect 
contractor misconduct data and POGO maintains a database supporting the U.S. 
government contractor oversight program and U.S. government contracting officials 
(Warnock, 2012). The U.S. government requires contracting officials to deposit all 




U.S. government lists 450,000 active federal government contractors (FPDS, 2014). The 
contractors listed range from microbusiness to large companies with thousands of 
employees (Roberts, 2010). POGO collects and maintains datasets on the top 100 
contractors annually (POGO, 2014).  
I used purposive sampling to determine my sample group. Huck et al. (2010) 
defined purposive sampling as the intentional selection of a homogeneous subset from a 
larger population. I selected the top 100 government contractors for each year studied to 
represent the larger group of 455,000 active, registered contractors (FPDS, 2014). The 
top 100 federal government contractors varied year-to-year for the years covered in the 
study. The top 100 government contractors included 182 different contractors from 2006 
through 2008 and from 2010 to 2012. The top 100 government contractors were awarded 
between 53.9% in 2010 and 58.1% in 2008 (see Figure 1) of all government contract 
awards for years covered in the study (Federal Procurement Data System [FPDS], 2014). 
My intentional selection of the top 100 government contractors met Huck et al.’s 
(2010) purposive sampling method. Furthermore, the study’s subset of the top 100 federal 
government contractors met Muskat, Blackman, and Muskat’s (2012) requirement that a 
representative population must be large enough to generate sufficiently representative 
data. U.S. government contract spending varied during the years selected for the study 
from a low of $404 billion in 2006 to a high of $531 billion in 2011 (see Figure 2). 
Contract awards for the top 100 government contractors varied during the same time 




Despite the varying amounts for contract awards, the top 100 government contractors 
were awarded greater than 50% of all contract awards (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Government contract award percentages. This graph represents the contract 
award percentages for the top 100 and outside the top 100 government contractors during 
2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2. Contract award values. This graph represents the contract award values for all 
government contractors, in millions, annually from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 


































Figure 3. Top 100 contractor contract award values. This graph represents the contract 
award values for the top 100 government contractors, in millions, annually from 2006 
through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014). 
 
The data originally collected by POGO and stored in FAPIIS represented a variety 
of goods and services provided by the federal government contracting industry. Two 
eligibility requirements existed for inclusion in the purposive sample group. Participants 
were registered in SAM as active members when data collection occurred, and 
participants were listed in the top 100 federal contractors according to the FPDS annual 
contractor report (FPDS, 2014). The sample size, representing 55% of all contract awards 
for the periods listed, represented the federal government contracting industry and met 
Meckstroth’s (2012) requirement that a study’s inferred results accurately represent the 
larger industry. 
Ethical Research 
The study does not contain information gathered from individual participants. The 
lack of individual participants rendered consent forms, incentives, withdrawal processes, 
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confidentiality agreements, and cooperation agreements unnecessary. POGO permits 
public access to their federal contractor misconduct reporting records. The U.S. 
government’s FAPIIS database is accessible to the public. Public access to the two data 
sources selected for this study rendered written permission unnecessary. POGO and 
FAPIIS collect, control, manage, and secure all data used in this study. Data collected for 
this study are stored on an external storage device and secured in my home safe when not 
in my possession. Federal government contractor names were removed and replaced by a 
generic numerical code accessible only on the external storage device.  
 Wester (2011) believed that researchers must use ethical practices throughout the 
study process. The institutional review boards (IRBs) are responsible for ensuring 
researchers conduct studies ethically (Chappy & Gaberson, 2012). IRBs ensure that a 
researcher follows policies, procedures, ethical practices, and laws (Chappy & Gaberson, 
2012). Furthermore, IRBs ensure a study participant’s ethical treatment. I sought and 
received Walden University’s IRB approval, IRB approval number 07-17-14-0340399, 
before beginning the study’s data collection and analysis phase. I complied with the 
IRB’s guidance and with Wester’s belief that researchers must follow strict ethical 
guidelines throughout the study process.  
Data Collection 
Instruments 
POGO’s data collection instrument is a digital corruption reporting form that is 
accessible to anyone seeking to report suspected contractor misconduct outside of official 




answer a series of eight open-ended questions. The questions cover eight separate areas 
required for the allegations investigation and verification. The areas include the 
government agency involved, specific misconduct incident, status of the incident, request 
for evidence, awareness of breadth of misconduct behavior, others told of the incident, 
others aware of the incident, and any actions taken against the individual reporting the 
incident. Reported misconduct is investigated and verified by qualified POGO employees 
before inclusion on POGO’s misconduct database. Investigative techniques include 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, interviews, and legal document searches. 
POGO employees transfer valid reports of contractor misconduct to POGO’s contractor 
misconduct database, and link investigatory data to each reported misconduct incident 
listed in POGO’s database. POGO secures the misconduct report information database 
inside of the POGO facility.  
Two government databases provide the information available on the FAPIIS 
database (FAPIIS, 2014). Government contracting officers must complete annual reports 
on all contracts under their supervision (Warnock, 2012). The COR or COTR completes 
a two-item, yes or no, quantitative questionnaire (FAPIIS, 2014). The information 
requested in the questionnaire includes verification that the contractor is a prime 
contractor with a current contract and an active registrant in SAM, and reported or 
alleged misconduct incidences within the past 5 years (FAPIIS, 2014). Government 
contractors are required to complete the same questionnaire annually when registering as 
an active business in SAM (FAR, 2014). The U.S. government requires contracting 




occurring within the previous 5 years, and then post the information in the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) database. (FAPIIS, 2014; 
Warnock, 2012). FAPIIS extracts questionnaire and spreadsheet data from both SAM and 
CPARS and compiles the information into a publically available spreadsheet 
encompassing applicable misconduct information reported since April 15, 2011 
(Warnock, 2012).  
In 1995, POGO founders responded to the general public’s opinion that federal 
contractors may be corrupt and began operating the contractor misconduct database 
(POGO, 2014; Sonn & Gebreselassie, 2010). POGO employees created the Federal 
Contractor Misconduct Database (FCMD) in 2002 to hold the U.S. government and 
contractors accountable for fraud, waste, and abuse (Stanley, 2012). POGO’s contractor 
misconduct database provides an alternative to government or contractor employees who 
want to report misconduct without fear of reprisal (POGO, 2014). POGO employees link 
data available on the publically accessible misconduct database to legal findings and 
other credible sources (Staley, 2012).  
The U.S. government created FAPIIS under The Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2009 (Warnock, 2012). Willard (2013) stated that the U.S. 
government created FAPIIS to increase transparency in the contracting process. Congress 
intended FAPIIS to improve contractor responsibility by improving contracting officials’ 
awareness of contractor performance and reducing instances of misconduct (Nackman et 
al., 2011; Warnock, 2012). FAPIIS is the government-controlled repository of reported 




I collected data from both POGO and FAPIIS databases to compile a list of 
reported incidences of government contractor misconduct. FPDS’s annual contractor 
reports list the top 100 federal contractors for each year studied (FPDS, 2014). The two 
databases, compiled according the contractors listed in FPDS’s annual reports, comprised 
the reported instances of government contractor misconduct. I collected data from the 
SAM database and FPDS annual reports pertaining to government contractor’s 
establishment of corporate ethics programs. 
I added the number of instances of reported misconduct for the top 100 
contractors in 2006, 2007, and 2008. I computed the median for each year and the overall 
median for the 3 years. Moreover, I computed the median for 2010, 2011, and 2012; next, 
I computed the overall median for 2010 through 2012. I used the Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
test to determine how much the rate of reported misconduct declined after the change to 
the FAR in 2009.  
I collected data from POGO, SAM, and FPDS to determine the level of the top 
100 contractors’ ethics programs before and after the change to the FAR in 2009. The 
FAR (2014) part 32.203.13 requires that corporate ethics programs include four parts: (a) 
a formal corporate ethics program, (b) a written code of business ethics and conduct, (c) 
ethics awareness and compliance training, and (d) an internal noncompliance reporting 
process. I assigned a numerical value, ranging from 0 to 4, corresponding with the 
number of requirements that each contractor met. I added the scores and computed the 
medians for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2012. I computed the median for the 3 




test to determine how much government contractor corporate ethics business processes 
changed after the change to the FAR in 2009. 
Data Collection Technique 
The GAO collected misconduct data in two separate organizations, CPARS and 
SAM, and combined the data into one publically available database called FAPIIS 
(Warnock, 2012). POGO collected misconduct data from sources reluctant to report 
incidences into the government system for fear of reprisal (Staley, 2012). Each 
organization does not allow access to misconduct information prior to verifying the 
information through recognized investigatory techniques (Warnock, 2012). Data I 
collected from FAPIIS and POGO were properly vetted and each misconduct instance 
and supporting documentation traced from reporting through legal finding. 
 The data collected contained categories that include the contractor’s name, 
contracting agency, type of misconduct, legal finding, and reported date of misconduct. 
The categories and data organization allowed for targeted reporting on instances of 
misconduct by any of the top 100 federal government contractors. I did not run a pilot 
program because FAPIIS data are collected through the government’s contractor 
misconduct data collection program, and POGO’s data collection program has existed 
since 1995. 
Data Organization Techniques 
FAPIIS data are available in Excel spreadsheet format. POGO data are available 
through an online database format that required entry into an Excel spreadsheet format. 




transcription into Excel spreadsheet format. I organized the data into two datasets of 
annual reported federal contractor misconduct; from 2006 through 2008 (Time 1) and 
from 2010 through 2012 (Time 2). Moreover, I categorized the number of instances of 
misconduct into six columns organized by year. I processed the data through Statistical 
Program for Social Science (SPSS) Statistics Grad Pack version 20.0. 
I categorized the contractor ethics business processes data into six columns. The 
first three columns included years 2006 through 2008 (Time 1). The last three columns 
included years 2010 through 2012 (Time 2). I assigned a value to each contractor 
indicating the level of presence of a corporate ethics program. The values correlated with 
the number of corporate ethics program requirements met, ranging from 0 to 4.  
Study data are stored on an external drive and secured within my personal 
fireproof safe. I removed contractor names from the data collected and substituted a 
numeric code that I secured in my personal safe, separately from the external drive. I will 
secure all data collected and analyzed for a period of 5 years post study completion. 
Data Analysis Technique 
I did not use a survey for data collection in this quantitative, causal-comparative 
study. The ex post facto datasets consisted of instances of federal government contractor 
misconduct from 2006 through 2012. The Close the Contractor Fraud Loophole Act in 
December 2008 caused a change to the FAR in 2009 (intervention) that required 
contractor self-reporting (Warnock, 2012). Furthermore, the self-reporting requirement 
was the government’s attempt to deter contractor misconduct (Warnock, 2012). Two 




in two time periods that were divided by the change to the FAR in 2009 (intervention). I 
used data from 2006 through 2008 (Time 1) to represent preintervention, and data from 
2010 through 2012 (Time 2) to represent postintervention instances of reported contractor 
misconduct (dependent variable) and government contractor ethics business process 
(dependent variable). 
 SPSS is an accepted statistical analysis tool (Yu-Jia, 2012). SPSS allowed for 
determining if a cause-and-effect relationship existed between the rates of reported 
federal contractor misconduct preintervention and the rates postintervention. I used the 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test in SPSS to determine if the reported misconduct was 
significantly reduced after the change to the FAR in 2009. Moreover, I used the 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to determine the impact of the change to the FAR in 2009 
effected government contractor ethics business processes. The annual top 100 
government contractor misconduct data from the 3-year groups pre and post the change 
to the FAR in 2009 were added together (n = 300).  
My null hypotheses were (H10) that there was no significant decline in the rate of 
reported contractor misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009 and (H20) there was 
no statistically significant change in government contractors ethics business processes 
after the change to the FAR in 2009. U.S. government officials changed the FAR in 2009 
to deter contractor misconduct (Warnock, 2012). The effectiveness of those actions could 
be related to deterrence theory. The data collection, organization, and analysis enabled 




Reliability and Validity 
Reliability 
Reliability is the repeatability of the research findings in quantitative 
methodology studies (Farrelly, 2013). The data analysis technique is reliable if other 
researchers have used the same or similar technique and reached the same results. I used 
matching and Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests for analysis. Brewer and Kuhn (2010) 
recommended these two techniques for causal-comparative research design. My study 
was similar in that I sought to determine if the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 
2009 reduced misconduct or changed government contractor ethics business processes. I 
compared the rates of reported misconduct from before and after the change to the FAR 
in 2009 to determine if reported misconduct declined by more than 5%. Furthermore, I 
compared changes in government contractor ethics business processes before and after 
the change to the FAR in 2009 to determine if contractor ethics business processes 
changed by more than 5%.  
Researchers must take care to (a) avoid biases that interfere with data collection 
or (b) misrepresent the data collected (Farrelly, 2013). Moreover, Farrelly (2013) 
believed that researchers should seek confirmation of data from two separate sources if 
looking at historical or precollected data. I collected data from three sources, POGO, 
FPDS, and FAPIIS, which gathered information from a variety of sources to capture 
reported federal government contractor misconduct and contract awards. Moreover, I 




government contractor ethics business processes. Research personal bias did not 
influence the collection of this empirical data.  
Farrelly (2013) believed the researcher must be credible and qualified. I meet 
these requirements through 20 years of experience in federal government contracting on 
both the U.S. government side and the government contractor side. I served as a trained 
COR, COTR on multiple contracts and in various positions as a government contractor. I 
conformed to Farrelly’s (2013) belief that quantitative research includes both numeric 
and verbal explanations of findings. I used approved research methods, designs, 
techniques, and procedures to ensure reliability. 
Validity 
Reliability is vital but unattainable without validity (Farrelly, 2013). Validity 
measures the investigative quality of the research in a quantitative study. Thorkildsen 
(2010) stated that validity is simply an argument that supports a concept by using data. 
The complexity of an argument does not determine validity. The ability to answer the 
research question completely determines validity. The argument can be as simple as 
determining between a yes and no. My study was an argument to determine if the U.S. 
government policies to reduce misconduct have been effective. The hypotheses phrased 
the question and required a simple yes or no response.  
Farrelly (2013) defined validity as the ability to reach the same result given the 
same data. DeForge (2010) stated that validity is a measure of the truthfulness of a 
researcher’s inferences. Controlling threats to validity reduces the researcher’s risk in 




mitigating the applicable threats to validity to ensure the validity of research results 
(Petrocelli, 2010). Four threats to validity exist: internal, external, statistical conclusion, 
and construct validity (DeForge, 2010). 
Internal validity focuses on events during the experiment that influence the 
research variables (DeForge, 2010). The threat events pose alternative reasons for 
resultant outcomes. Mitigating or eliminating these events was key to establishing 
validity for my study. In my study, I inferred results based upon the U.S. government’s 
deterrent initiatives against contractor misconduct. I reviewed anomalies within the top 
100 contractors and searched for additional influences such as change in corporate 
leadership or corporate policies outside of those prescribed by U.S. government 
regulations.  
Lobmeier (2010) defined internal validity in nonexperimental design as the 
determination that there is not more than one explanation for the resultant. Random 
selection of participants reduces the threat to nonexperimental validity (Lobmeier, 2010). 
In my study, the participant group was randomly selected through meeting a set 
performance criteria. The participants were the top 100 federal contractors in the value of 
contract awards for the applicable year. Lobmeier listed the manipulation of groups 
through researcher bias and variance in data collection as additional threats to validity. In 
my study, the groups were predetermined by contract award while the data collected was 
historical records that did not change over time, thus reducing threats to validity.  
 External validity is concerned with the applicability of theory to the experiment 




infer causal correlation between the change to the FAR in 2009 and (a) the reduction in 
the rates of reported government contractor misconduct, or (b) the changes in government 
contractor ethics business processes. External validity is important to a researcher who 
desires to generalize results from a target group to wider group (Leighton, 2010).  
Threats to external validity include random sampling and variances within the 
population selected (Leighton, 2010). Random sampling is vital to external validity. The 
participant group in my study was randomly selected by contract award as defined within 
FPDS to become a part of the top 100 federal contractors. The specific criteria for 
inclusion in the sample group, a top 100 contractor by contract awards, meets Leighton’s 
(2010) goal for increasing external validity through narrowly defined criteria. The top 
100 contractors provided a variety of goods or services accounting for 55% of 
government contract awards; however, the FAR applies to all government contractors 
equally (Warnock, 2012). Therefore, according to Warnock (2012), any variance within 
the population’s business offering should not influence the contractor’s propensity for 
adhering to or ignoring the ethical rules imposed by the U.S. government.  
 Statistical conclusion validity differs from internal and external validity in that it 
refers to events that influence the relationship between the research variables (DeForge, 
2010). Statistical conclusion validity requires that a researcher base inferred results on the 
studied variable and not on other variables (Mendoza & Marcus-Mendoza, 2010). 
Quantitative research results are statistically significant or are not statistically significant 




Petrocelli (2010) stated that statistical conclusion validity is threatened either by 
rejecting a true null hypothesis (Type I error) or not rejecting a false null hypothesis. 
Quantitative researchers require that the probability of the conclusions statistical 
significance be less than 5% (Petrocelli, 2010). I used a one-tailed test to measure the 
statistical significance of the reduction in the rate of reported misconduct after 2009. The 
one-tailed test determines statistical significance when testing one side of a t-distribution 
(Stone, 2010). I used a two-tailed test to measure the statistical significance of the change 
in government contractor ethics business processes after 2009. Stone (2010) stated that 
the two-tailed test determines statistical significance when testing two sides of a t-
distribution. Mendoza and Marcus-Mendoza (2010) stated that equalizing two or more 
groups into one matched group achieves statistical conclusion validity.  
Petrocelli (2010) believed that Type II errors that threaten validity included small 
sample size, varying sample selection criterion, and using an inappropriate statistical test. 
The federal government contractor industry offers a wide variety of goods and services; 
however, purposive sampling of the pool without regard for variety and combining them 
into one matched group using the top 100 criteria mitigated the Type II error threat (Huck 
et al., 2010; Petrocelli, 2010). The study pertained to the entire industry and the variable 
of change to the FAR in 2009 applied to the government contracting industry without 
regard for goods and services (Warnock, 2012).  
The last of DeForge’s (2010) threats to validity was construct validity. Markus 
and Lin (2010) defined construct validity as the collection of evidence intended to 




deficiency and construct-irrelevant variance are the two threats to construct validity 
(Markus & Lin, 2010). Construct deficiency happens when the research tool fails to 
measure the desired construct. Construct-irrelevant variance exists when the tool 
measures the information that is not relevant to the construct.  
Markus and Lin (2010) believed careful examination of the desired tool coupled 
with inspection of the resultant would enable the researcher to verify construct validity. I 
originally examined the results before and after the change to the FAR in 2009 with the 
paired-samples t test (Stone, 2010); however, after determining that the differences 
between the samples violated the required assumptions, I changed to a nonparametric test 
of similar design. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is similar to the paired-samples t test, 
but the nonparametric test does not have the restrictive outlier assumptions of the paired-
samples t test (Gao, 2010). The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was the appropriate tool for 
determining the significance of differences between matched groups before and after an 
intervention (Sawilosky, 2007). I used the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to measure the 
change in contractor ethics business processes by comparing the business processes 
before and after the change to the FAR in 2009. In my study, I compared the rates of 
reported misconduct and measured the change in government contractor ethics business 
processes by the top 100 contractors before and after the change to the FAR in 2009.  
Transition and Summary 
Section 2 detailed the research phase of the project. The section began with a 
restatement of the study’s purpose to determine if a causal relationship exists between the 




misconduct. Section 2 continued by defining my data collection role as the study’s 
researcher. The section contained the rational for not requiring the selection of study 
participants or individuals. The section included explanations for selecting quantitative 
methodology and retrospective causal-comparative design. In Section 2, I explained 
selecting the top 100 federal contractors and the purposive sampling technique. The 
section included details about POGO’s data collection instruments and the U.S. 
government’s data collection procedures. I addressed selecting matching and Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test for analysis, and the reliability and validity implications and steps 
required. 
 Section 3 presents the overall study and study results. The section begins with an 
overview of the study and presentation of findings. I discuss how the findings may 
improve the government contracting industry’s business practices and implications for 
social change. The section contains listed recommendations for action and further study. 




Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Sonn and Gebreselassie (2010) found reported misconduct in 80% of the top 100 
government contractors. Moreover, POGO (2014) listed 60 of the top 100 government 
contractors with multiple violations. The U.S. government changed the FAR in 2009 to 
reduce misconduct violations through increased oversight, expanded enforcement 
authority, and new mandatory business processes for the government contracting industry 
(OSBP, 2011; POGO, 2014). I conducted this study to determine if a causal relationship 
exists between the change to the FAR in 2009 and (a) the number of reported acts of 
contractor misconduct by government contractors and (b) government contractor ethics 
business processes. 
Overview of Study 
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-
comparative study was to (a) discover if the U.S. government’s change in 2009 to the 
FAR has reduced the rate of reported contractor misconduct and (b) investigate the 
impact of the change to the FAR in 2009 on federal government contractor ethics 
business processes. Two 3-year time groups, pre (Time 1) and post (Time 2) the U.S. 
government’s change to the FAR in 2009, comprised the study’s independent variable. 
The rate of reported government contractor misconduct, and government contractor 
ethics business processes are the two dependent variables. I created two research 
questions, one for each independent and dependent variable relationship, to aid in 
determining the study findings. Null and alternative hypotheses were established to 




I developed Research Question 1 to find if the change to the FAR in 2009 reduced 
the rates of reported government contractor misconduct. The alternative hypothesis (H1a) 
stated that there is a statistically significant decline in the rate of reported misconduct 
after the change to the FAR in 2009. The null hypothesis (H10) stated that there was no 
statistically significant decline in the rate of reported contractor misconduct after the 
change to the FAR in 2009. I conducted a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test of the data 
collected for the 3 years before 2009 (Time 1) and the 3 years after 2009 (Time 2). The 
results indicated that the null hypothesis was not rejected, p = .34 (see Table 2). 
Therefore, the change to the FAR in 2009 did not significantly reduce the rate of 
contractor misconduct. 
I developed an alternative and null hypothesis to aid in answering if the change to 
the FAR in 2009 affected government contractor ethics business processes. The 
alternative hypothesis (H2a) developed for Research Question 2 stated that there is a 
statistically significant change in the government contractors ethics business processes 
after the change to the FAR in 2009. The null hypothesis was that there was no 
statistically significant change in the government contractors’ ethics business processes 
after the change to the FAR in 2009. I conducted a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test of the data 
collected for the 3 years before 2009 (Time 1) and the 3 years after 2009 (Time 2). The 
results indicated that the null hypothesis was rejected, p < .001 (see Table 6). Therefore, 





Presentation of the Findings 
Roberts (2010) stated that the change to the FAR in 2009 was implemented to 
deter contractor misconduct. I conducted this quantitative, nonexperimental, 
retrospective, causal-comparative study to determine how the rate of government 
contractor misconduct (dependent variable) and changes to government contracting 
industry ethics business processes (dependent variable) were impacted by the change to 
the FAR in 2009. I collected, organized, and used SPSS analytic software to analyze the 
data. The findings to Research Questions 1 and 2 follow.  
Research Question 1 
The rate of government contractor misconduct was the dependent variable for 
Research Question 1. The independent variable for Research Question 1 was time, with 
two conditions. Each condition pertained to a 3-year period of time, Time 1 (pre change 
to the FAR in 2009) and Time 2 (post change to the FAR in 2009).  
The rate of reported acts of misconduct by government contractors is the first 
dependent variable. The research question for this dependent variable was designed to 
investigate if the change to the FAR in 2009 reduced the rates of reported government 
contractor misconduct. The data indicated that the number of reported acts of misconduct 
studied ranged from a low of 32 in 2012 to a high of 124 in 2007; however, no trend was 





Figure 4. Top 100 contractors misconduct. This graph represents the reported instances 
of misconduct annually for the top 100 government contractors from 2006 through 2008 
and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014). 
 
Data collected from FAPIIS were not as informative as I anticipated; therefore, I 
relied on data collected from FPDS and POGO, which I compared with FAPIIS data. The 
information available on FAPIIS was limited to either a yes or no answer pertaining to 
contractor misconduct within the last 5-years. No quantification data existed in FAPIIS 
and the reliability of FAPIIS is questionable because 45% of the top 100 contractors 
covered in the time frame of the study with instances of misconduct after 2010 did not 
report any instance of misconduct to FAPIIS (see Figure 5).  
The research data indicated a variety of conclusions to reported government 
contractor misconduct. Reported contractor misconduct resulted in 62.6% of settlements 
by the contractor without admitting fault, while 1.2% of the government contractors were 




















Figure 5. FAPIIS reporting compliance. This graph represents government contractor 
FAPIIS reporting compliance from 2010 through 2012 (FAPIIS, 2014; POGO, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 6. Top 100 misconduct outcomes. This graph represents the percentage of 
resultant actions for acts of contractor misconduct from 2006 through 2008 and from 
2010 through 2012 (POGO, 2014). 
 
I developed an alternative and null hypothesis to aid in answering Research 
Question 1. The alternative hypothesis (H1a) stated that there is a statistically significant 



















hypothesis (H10) stated that there was no statistically significant decline in the rate of 
reported contractor misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009. I conducted a 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test comparing the data collected for the 3 years before 2009 
(Time 1) and the 3 years after 2009 (Time 2). The results indicated that the null 
hypothesis was not rejected, p = .34. Therefore, the change to the FAR in 2009 did not 
significantly reduce the rate of contractor misconduct.  
I determined that my original choice for analysis, the paired samples t test, was 
inappropriate after discovering that the data violated the assumption of normality, p < 
.001 (see Table 1). Therefore, I shifted to the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. The Wilcoxon 
is a nonparametric test of similar design test that allowed for data that did not meet the 
paired samples t test assumptions.  
Table 1 
Shapiro-Wilk Test: Test of Normality for Reported Contractor Misconduct 
 
Statistic df P 
RCM Time 2 – RCM Time 1   .862
 
300       < .001 
    
Note. RCM = reported contractor misconduct; Time 1 = 2006 through 2008; Time 2 = 
2010 through 2012. 
 
The selection of the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test required reviewing three 
assumptions to ensure appropriateness. First, each pair of observations represented 
members of the top 100 government contractors for their respective times and were 
independent of all other pairs of observations. Next, the 300 paired values (see Table 3) 




ties (see Table 3), there were 172 nontied scores from the 300 pairings (see Figure 7); 
thereby mitigating the risk of continuous and symmetrical scores within the population.  
 
Figure 7. Pie chart of tied pairs.  This is the graphic representation of the tied paired-
groups for the 3-year time periods before and after the change to the FAR in 2009. 
 
A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the change 
to the FAR in 2009 on the rate of reported government contractor misconduct. The 
independent variable was time, with two conditions, Time 1 and Time 2. Time 1 was pre-
2009 (2006 – 2008) and Time 2 was post 2009 (2010 – 2012). The results indicated that 
the rate of reported government contractor misconduct was not significantly impacted by 
the change to the FAR in 2009, z = -0.949, p = .34 (see Table 2), N = 172, r = -.072 (see 
Table 3); therefore, the null hypothesis that there was no statistically significant decline 
in rate of reported contractor misconduct was not rejected. The median score for reported 








median score for reported contractor misconduct higher after the change to the FAR in 




: Reported Contractor Misconduct 
 
RCM Time 2 – 
RCM Time 1 
 Z -.949
b 
p (2-tailed) .343 
Note. RCM = reported contractor misconduct; Time 1 = 2006 through 2008;  
Time 2 = 2010 through 2012. 
a 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. 
b 
Based on positive ranks. 
Table 3 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Reported Contractor Misconduct 
 
N Median score Sum of ranks 
RCM Time 2 – RCM 











   
  
    
Note. RCM = reported contractor misconduct; Time 1 = 2006 through 2008;  
Time 2 = 2010 through 2012. 
a 
RCM Time 2 < RCM Time 1. 
b 
RCM Time 2 > RCM Time 1. 
c 
RCM Time 2 = RCM Time 1. 
 
Paternoster (2010) explained that in implementing deterrence theory, laws are 
created, violations discovered, and penalties imposed, all with the desire of modifying 
behavior. The change to the FAR in 2009 was created with the desire to reduce 
misconduct (Dorey et al., 2012). Roberts (2010) stated that problems exist with the U.S. 




The finding that there was no significant decline in the rate of reported contractor 
misconduct despite the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 2009, supported 
Roberts’ belief while disconfirming Dorey et al.’s (2012) conclusions.  
The findings further supported Robert’s (2010) belief that changing ethical rules 
and regulations does not guarantee change in unethical behavior. Detection of misconduct 
is a key component of deterrence theory (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). Through the findings, 
I detected misconduct and inferred that the oversight component of the U.S. 
government’s deterrent actions was functional. However, the lack of significant reduction 
in misconduct after the change to the FAR in 2009 infers that the U.S. government’s 
deterrence actions were not completely functional. Moreover, because the change to the 
FAR in 2009 did not significantly reduce reported acts of misconduct, I questioned the 
impact of the change to the FAR in 2009 on the government contracting industry 
implementation of the required ethics programs. 
Research Question 2 
The second dependent variable was the government contractor ethics business 
processes. I designed Research Question 2 to aid in investigating how the change to the 
FAR in 2009 affected government contractor ethics business processes. I categorized the 
data to indicate compliance scores for each year studied. Compliance scores ranged from 
a score of 0, for no components, to a score of 4, for all four components of a viable 
contractor ethics program as required by the change to the FAR (2008). Upon 




a compliance score of 4 ranged from a low of 6 in 2006, to a high of 78 in 2008 and 2009 
(see Figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8. Top 100 scoring a 4. This graph represents the number of top 100 government 
contractors with all four elements of ethical business programs outlined in change to the 
FAR in 2009 from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 
2014).  
 
Government contractor employment of each individual element varied; however, 
the 2006 remained the lowest scoring year, while 2010 remained the highest scoring year. 
Contractors with a formal ethics program ranged from 6 in 2006 to 80 in 2010 (see Figure 
9). Contractors with a written code of ethics ranged from 57 in 2006 to 92 in 2010 (see 






















Figure 9. Top 100 with an ethics program. This graph represents the top 100 government 
contractors with formal ethics programs from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 




Figure 10. Top 100 with a code of ethics. This graph represents the number of top 100 
government contractors with a written code of ethics from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 




































Contractors with a corporate ethics and compliance training program ranged from 
17 in 2006 to 78 in 2010 (see Figure 11). Government contractors with internal 
noncompliance reporting processes ranged from a low of 22 in 2006 to a high of 83 in 
2010 (see Figure 12). Finally, the research data indicated a 433% increase in functional 
ethics programs to comply with the change to the FAR in 2009; increasing from 18 with 




Figure 11. Top 100 with ethics training programs.  This graph represents the number of 
top 100 government contractors with ethics training programs from 2006 through 2008 






















Figure 12. Top 100 with internal compliance processes.  This graph represents the 
number of top 100 government contractors with internal noncompliance reporting 
processes from 2006 through 2008 and 2010 through 2012 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 13. 2008 ethics program compliance. This graph represents the number of top 100 
government contractors with all four elements of ethical business programs outlined in 

























Figure 14. 2010 ethics program compliance. This graph represents the number of top 100 
government contractors with all four elements of ethical business programs outlined in 
change to the FAR in 2009 in 2010 (FPDS, 2014; POGO, 2014). 
 
I developed an alternative and null hypothesis to aid in answering Research 
Question 2. The alternative hypothesis (H2a) developed for this research question stated 
that there is a statistically significant change in the government contractors ethics 
business processes after the change to the FAR in 2009. The null hypothesis was that 
there was no statistically significant change in the government contractors’ ethics 
business processes after the change to the FAR in 2009.  
My second research question centered on prevention and detection, which are two 
of the components that Best (2013) listed as essential components of deterrence theory. 
The dependent variable for Research Question 2 was government contractor ethics 
business processes. The independent variable for Research Question 2 was time, with two 








in 2009). I initially chose to analyze the data through a paired samples t test; however, I 
determined that the paired samples t test was inappropriate after discovering that the data 
violated the assumption of normality. Therefore, I chose the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, 
which is a nonparametric test of similar design test that allows for data that violates the 
paired samples t test assumptions. 
Table 4 
Shapiro-Wilk Test: Test of Normality for Contractor Ethics Business Processes 
 
Statistic df P 
GCEBP Time 2 – GCEBP Time 1   .886
 
300       < .001 
    
Note. GCEBP = government contractor ethics business processes; Time 1 = 2006 through 
2008; Time 2 = 2010 through 2012. 
 
The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test required reviewing three assumptions to ensure 
appropriateness. First, each pair of observations represented members of the top 100 
government contractors for their respective times and were independent of all other pairs 
of observations. Next, the 300 (see Table 5) paired values was a large enough sample size 
to yield accurate z test results. Finally, while there were 42 ties, there were 258 nontied 
differences (see Figure 15), which indicated a low risk of noncontinuous and 





Figure15. Pie chart of tied pairs for RQ 2.  This is a graphic representation of the tied 
pairs distribution for the contractor ethics business processes pre and post the change to 
the FAR in 2009. 
 
I conducted a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test to evaluate the impact of the change to 
the FAR in 2009 on changing government contractor ethics business processes. The 
independent variable was time, with two conditions, Time 1 and Time 2. Time 1 was pre-
2009 (2006 through 2008) and Time 2 was post-2009 (2010 through 2012). The results 
indicated that government contractor ethics business processes were significantly 
impacted by the change to the FAR in 2009, z = -12.263, p < .001 (see Table 6), N = 258, 
r = -.763 (see Table 5); therefore, the null hypothesis that there was no statistically 
significant impact in government contractor ethics business processes after the change to 
the FAR in 2009 was rejected. The median score for government contractor ethics 
business processes that were higher before the change to the FAR in 2009 was 73.40, 
while the median score for government contractor ethics business processes that were 









Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Contractor Ethics Business Processes 
 N Median score Sum of ranks 
GCEBP Time 2 – 
GCEBP Time 1  
Negative Ranks 26
a 








    
  
    
Note. GCEBP = government contractor ethics business processes;  
Time 1 = 2006 through 2008; Time 2 = 2010 through 2012. 
a 
GCEBP Time 2 < GCEBP Time 1. 
b 
GCEBP Time 2 > GCEBP Time 1. 
c 




: Contractor Ethics Business Processes 
 
GCEBP Time 




p (2-tailed) < .001 
Note. GCEBP = government contractor ethics business processes;  
Time 1 = 2006 through 2008; Time 2 = 2010 through 2012. 
a 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test. 
b 
Based on positive ranks. 
 
Dorey et al. (2012) found that the U.S. government implemented the change to the 
FAR in 2009 to deter contractor misconduct. The findings in Research Question 1 
inferred that change did not have the desired impact. The findings to Research Question 2 
inferred that the government contracting industry’s functional ethics business processes 
were significantly impacted. Paternoster’s (2010) belief that in implementing deterrence 
theory, laws are created to modify contractor behavior was supported by the increase the 




before 2009 to 133.14 after 2009. Deterrence theory worked in spurring change in 
contractor business processes; however, the changes did not lead to significant reductions 
in reported contractor misconduct. The findings support Stegman’s (2010) belief that 
changing business processes does not guarantee change in corporate behavior. The 
findings extend the literature on government contractor ethics business processes, on 
contractor ethical behavior, and how the two are not necessarily related. The findings 
extend the understanding of the application of deterrence theory in modifying contractor 
behavior, including what was and was not effective. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
The U.S. government has continued to take steps to deter contractor misconduct, 
including the change to the FAR in 2009 (Roberts, 2010). The U.S. government’s 
deterrent actions include imposing new rules and regulations governing conduct, creating 
additional oversight programs, and expanding punishment for violations (Amirkhanyan et 
al., 2010). U.S. government contracting officials, as well and government contracting 
industry executives may benefit from understanding the study findings to infer the level 
of success of the change to the FAR in 2009. 
Dorey et al. (2012) stated that the U.S. government contracting officials designed 
the change to the FAR in 2009 to deter contractor misconduct; however, no academic 
information was available that determined if the change had the desired effect. Research 
Question 1 in the study addressed the lack of information on the trend of misconduct post 
the change to the FAR in 2009. Through interpreting the findings, I increased the 




contractor misconduct has not significantly declined despite the deterrent steps taken. 
Government contracting officials and contracting industry executives may use the 
findings to seek ways to reduce misconduct beyond the steps already taken. The findings 
for Research Question 2 indicated that the U.S. government’s deterrent steps significantly 
impacted the contracting industry’s ethical business processes. Government officials may 
take the knowledge in understanding what was effective and apply similar techniques to 
improve upon what was unsuccessful. 
Two of the three essential elements of deterrence theory, prevention and 
detection, were addressed by the change to the FAR in 2009 (Best, 2013; Roberts, 2010). 
Moreover, the U.S. government’s change to the FAR in 2009 supported Paternoster’s 
(2010) belief that laws are created with the desire to modify behavior. The findings 
indicated that the government contracting industry made significant increases in their 
corporate ethics programs and therefore significant changes in their business processes. 
Stegman (2010) believed that implementing required corporate programs do not create 
change in corporate ethical behavior due to training shortfalls. The finding that the 
contracting industry implemented significant changes in ethics business process coupled 
with the finding that no significant change occurred in the rate of reported misconduct 
supports Stegman’s (2010) assertion that changing business processes does not guarantee 
a change in corporate behavior. Contracting industry executives may look at the findings 
and determine ethical training shortfalls and design training improvements that may lead 




The application of deterrence theory in the case of reducing contractor 
misconduct was made apparent through data collection and analysis. Deterrence theory is 
the threat of applying penalties to prevent illegal or unethical acts (Paternoster, 2010). 
The U.S. government contracting officials created a change to the FAR in 2009 to 
prevent future government contractor acts of misconduct (Roberts, 2010). The data 
indicated a 433% increase in functional corporate ethics programs, from which I inferred, 
true to deterrence theory, that corporate behavior was modified comply with the new 
regulation and prevent the U.S. government from applying penalties for noncompliance. 
Government officials can use similar deterrent steps to further modify contracting 
industry behavior. 
Bradshaw and Su (2013) determined that misconduct mitigation steps were 
ineffective because of the U.S. government’s lack of emphasis or inability to monitor, 
report, and share contractor performance information. Government contracting officials 
and contracting officers may improve the use and complexity of the existing contracting 
oversight programs. Furthermore, the contract violations enforcement areas of the U.S. 
government may improve violation enforcement, including enforcing the appearance of 
continued misconduct. The data indicated that the majority of reported contractor 
misconduct was settled without admitting fault, while 1% received the maximum 
punishment possible. Rogers (2010) believed that the government contracting industry 
places the highest value on profitability and comply only when profitability is threatened. 
U.S. government officials may use the findings to determine if increased cost for 




The findings may provide the federal government contracting industry with 
information to aid in reducing or deterring misconduct. The findings may inform leaders 
throughout the federal government contracting industry on the trends in contractor 
misconduct and government oversight. Rogers (2010) found that while the government 
may require corporations to acknowledge ethical standards, true corporate change is 
created internally (Rogers, 2010). Industry leaders may use the finding to understand that 
the current form of ethical business processes are insufficient and can investigate ways to 
improve; thereby, significantly reducing acts of misconduct as was the intent of the 
change to the FAR in 2009. Corporate leaders may investigate trends within their 
organizations and seek to improve ethical behavior through internal deterrent actions.  
The study findings may provide researchers, academicians, and U.S. government 
contracting officials with information on the effectiveness of deterrence theory to modify 
corporate ethical behavior. Academic investigation into successful application of 
deterrence theory in other areas such as speed limits (Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011), 
corporate anti-trust actions (Lande & Davis, 2011), nuclear deterrence or mutually 
assured destruction (O’Neil, 2011), and information security policies (Chen et al., 2012) 
demonstrate the effectiveness of deterrence theory. Researchers and academicians my 
review the findings and recommendations for further study to investigate the continued 





Implications for Social Change 
The implications for positive social change include the potential to improve 
corporate ethical behavior throughout the organization. The study data indicated 
instances of increased corporate social ethics programs as components of their ethics 
business processes. Improving corporate ethics business processes may lead to improved 
ethical conduct throughout the organization, which benefits all stakeholders, including 
society (DeCremer et al., 2010).  
The findings indicated a significant impact in government contractors increased 
ethics business processes. The threat of reduced contracts for noncompliance coupled 
with the increase in ethics programs support Demessie’s (2012) belief that corporations 
would change if the cost of not changing exceeds the cost of change. Further academic 
understanding may lead to increased public awareness campaigns that would impact the 
contracting industry’s bottom line, which could improve corporate ethical behavior.  
The findings indicated that government contractor misconduct was not 
significantly reduced by the change to the FAR in 2009. The findings, coupled with 
Cragg et al.’s (2012) belief that instances of misconduct are not confined to a single area, 
lead to the conclusion that unethical conduct may be a problem throughout an 
organization. Increased awareness of insignificant improvement in misconduct may lead 
to further actions designed to reduce misconduct; thereby improving ethical behavior 




Recommendations for Action 
The findings indicated that the change to the FAR in 2009 significantly impacted 
government contracting industry ethics business processes; however, the change did not 
attain Dorey et al.’s (2012) stated goals of reducing contractor misconduct. I propose 
recommendations for both the U.S. government contracting officials and government 
contracting industry executives. The recommendations include three recommendations 
for the U.S. government contracting officials and two recommendations for government 
contracting industry executives as a result of the findings.  
First, I recommend that the U.S. government contracting officials seek to improve 
oversight programs, such as FAPIIS, by requiring self-reporting of violations to be listed 
individually; thereby improving contracting officials understanding of a contractor’s 
ethical profile. Next, government contracting officials should review the instances of 
reported misconduct, compare the results with the information posted in FAPIIS, and 
recommend punitive action against noncompliant contractors. Finally, I recommend the 
government impose penalties that will reduce misconduct. The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (2014) lists penalties for contractor misconduct, which includes exclusion 
from the bidding process, fines, debarment, and criminal prosecution.  
The study data indicated that 37.4% of reported instances of misconduct resulted 
in imposed penalties (see Figure 14). Deterrence depends upon a government contractor 
believing acts of misconduct will be detected and the cost of the action to be greater than 




misconduct depends upon the likelihood of detection and increased cost to the 
government contractor for the act of misconduct. 
I recommend that government contracting industry executives improve internal 
misconduct reporting and publish misconduct statistics within annual reports. The study 
data indicated that ethical compliance programs are present in 78% of the top 100 
contractors since the change to the FAR in 2009 (see Figure 13); however, there was no 
significant reduction in acts of misconduct after the implementation of the ethical 
compliance programs. The findings support Sadler-Smith’s (2012) conclusion that 
corporate ethics programs inform and educate; however, unethical behavior persists.  
Industry executives should review the findings, determine if their corporate ethics 
programs are reducing misconduct, and revise the ethics program to improve ethical 
behavior. Amey (2012) believed the government contracting industry poorly performs 
internal oversight. I believe that improving internal oversight and reporting the results to 
corporate stakeholders could improve internal compliance and reduce instances of 
misconduct. Moreover, the government’s desire to reduce costs may lead to future 
changes that could threaten corporate profits for those who fail to prepare. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
My causal-comparative study findings determined that the change the FAR in 
2009 significantly impacted government contractor ethics business processes, yet did not 
significantly reduce reported contractor misconduct. I recommend three studies that 
would further academic understanding of the contractor misconduct issue. First, I 




of reported misconduct between contractors with high settlement percentages versus 
contractors that experience punitive actions. This study would further the understanding 
of deterrence theory in government contracting, specifically if punishment produces 
compliance.  
Next, I recommend a qualitative study of government contracting industry 
executives to determine the perceived level of believed probability of detection and threat 
of punishment. This study would measure the two aspects required in deterrence theory; 
the likelihood of detections and the belief that punishment for violations will exceed 
reward (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010; Qing et al., 2011). Understanding the perception of the 
government contracting industry executives may further understanding of why the change 
to the FAR in 2009 did not significantly reduced contractor misconduct. Finally, I 
recommend further exploration of contractor misconduct through a case study approach. 
Academicians may expand this research by studying companies with greater levels of 
misconduct or lesser levels of misconduct. Individual contractor based case studies would 
enhance the understanding of both academia and industry on government contractor 
misconduct and corporate ethical behavior. 
Reflections 
Investigating government contractor misconduct and government contracting 
industry ethics programs was both interesting and enlightening. Learning the history of 
government contracting, contracting misconduct, and government steps to deter 




government contracting, I had preconceived notions of what to expect prior to conducting 
the study.  
I chose quantitative methodology to limit my potential bias. Moreover, I selected 
a causal-comparative ex post facto design that required no participants; thereby 
eliminating effects or interactions with participants. I used official government and 
government watchdog databases as the source for all data used in the analysis. The 
potential for personal bias was limited to post analysis. I expected the acts of misconduct 
to remain the same or increase after the change to the FAR in 2009 and was surprised to 
find that misconduct had declined, albeit insignificantly. I interpreted the findings based 
upon unbiased analysis; therefore limiting any personal bias to explaining the findings.  
I assumed that government databases would provide adequate data for my study; 
however, my experience with FAPIIS did not meet my expectations. I anticipated 
collecting valuable data from FAPIIS; however, I found that almost half of the 
contractors studied did not report derogatory information in FAPIIS. I agree with Willard 
(2013) that the database was an unreliable source for information.  
The information gained and understanding obtained during this study spurred 
further curiosity. I am excited to see progress in reducing misconduct despite that the 
progress is not statistically significant. Understanding and improving corporate ethical 
behavior is my passion. The next phase of my research will be to understand corporate 
executive decision making in the area of ethical compliance. I look forward to learning 
more and to working to further improve the ethical climate within the government 




Summary and Study Conclusions 
The purpose of this quantitative, nonexperimental, retrospective, causal-
comparative study was to discover if the change to the FAR in 2009 has influenced the 
rate of reported contractor misconduct and to investigate the impact of the change on 
government contractor ethics business processes. Time, divided into 3-year time periods 
pre and post the change to the FAR in 2009, was the independent variable. The instances 
of reported contractor misconduct and the change in federal contractor ethics business 
processes were the dependent variables. I used Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests to analyze 
the data and infer the relationships between the study variables. 
Demessie (2012) believed that U.S. government officials created regulations 
designed to decrease misconduct, yet the regulations increased the propensity for 
misconduct. U.S. government contracting officials changed the FAR in 2009 to deter 
future instance of misconduct (Roberts, 2010). Effective deterrence begins with an 
individual’s belief that discovery of the misconduct is likely (Ogilvie & Stewart, 2010). 
The second component of effective deterrence requires that punishment for misconduct 
must exceed the potential reward for misconduct violations (Qing et al., 2011). 
Deterrence theory has proven effective in deterring nuclear war (O’Neil, 2011), in 
reducing instances of speeding (Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011), in limiting corporate 
antitrust actions (Lande & Davis, 2011) and in information assurance policies (Chen et 
al., 2012). 
The deterrent effect of the change to the FAR in 2009 met with mixed results in 




change to the FAR in 2009; however, the change was not significant. Further findings 
indicated that the change to the FAR in 2009 created significant change on the 
government contracting business processes. Kim and Lambright (2010) believed that the 
level of government involvement does not change contractor behavior. The findings 
dispute Kim and Lambright by indicating a significant change in contractor ethics 
business processes. Bell and Barkhuizen (2011) stated that influencing change within an 
organization begins with understanding the problem. Finding that U.S. government 
regulations can influence the government contracting industry provided evidence that the 
misconduct problem is correctable; however, the task of significantly reducing 
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